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 3 
Introduction 
 Climate change increasingly is becoming a major issue for the international 
community.  It is contributing to rising global temperatures, rising sea levels, drought, 
natural disaster intensification, and ecological damage, amongst other things.  A scientific 
consensus has emerged over recent years that implicates greenhouse gases, chief amongst 
them carbon dioxide, for causing global warming.  Climate scientists overwhelmingly 
agree that the greenhouse gas effect has been caused in large part by the spike of human 
emissions since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution.  To reverse the problem, the 
density of greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere, especially carbon dioxide, has to be 
reduced.  Doing so necessitates a combined approach of reducing emissions at present 
and in the future, and removing greenhouse gases currently present in Earth’s 
atmosphere. 
 This is easier said than done, though.  Climate change is an international issue, 
and threatens the entire globe.  However, there are some 200-odd countries in the world, 
all with very different domestic interests, political pressures, and energy industries.  The 
great challenge for combating climate change will be whether or not all these very 
distinct countries with very disparate interests will be able to form a cohesive front to 
combat climate change.  Indeed, climate change is a global problem with solutions that 
are at odds with local interests.  The asymmetry of these interests complicates efforts to 
combat climate change. 
 In 1992, the 197 members of the United Nations ratified the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Under the auspices of 
UNFCCC, the global community would immediately convene to try to move forward 
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with a broad multilateral agreement to combat climate change.  However, initial efforts 
failed miserably.  The first major failure occurred in Kyoto, Japan.  Although all 
participating member states agreed to the framework agreement, it was not ratified in the 
United States, at the time the largest economy and greatest emitter in the world, because 
of domestic political reasons.  The failure of the United States, the world’s great polluter, 
to get onboard with the agreement would set back negotiations for years to come. 
 The second blunder came in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009.  The newly 
emergent People’s Republic of China had overtaken the United States as the world’s 
largest polluter and largest economy despite still being in its development stages.  It still 
seemed that neither the United States nor China was yet serious about addressing the 
climate change issue, and without the two biggest polluters on board, there was little 
reason for any other country to agree to a framework to reduce their own emissions.  In 
addition, disagreements between developing and developed countries about negotiation 
approaches and goals plagued negotiations by creating an atmosphere of distrust.   
Clearly, if any success were to be made in multilateral negotiations, something would 
have to change. 
 The Administration of President Barak Obama, elected as the President of the 
United States in 2008, saw climate change as a hugely important issue.  Thus, the 
administration decided to pursue bilateral negotiations with the Chinese to produce some 
sort of climate change agreement.  A non-binding deal was struck in November of 2014 
in which both countries promised to meet emissions-reductions targets by specific years.  
The US pledged an economy-wide target of reducing its emissions by 26%-28% below 
its 2005 level in 2025.  The Chinese agreed to cap emissions growth by 2030.  While 
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these targets would be insufficient to combat climate change alone, the greater goal was 
mobilizing the international community to finally complete substantial multilateral 
negotiations, specifically at the next (and maybe last) UFCCC meeting in December of 
2015 in Paris, France. 
 The deal was not easily struck.  The Chinese were hesitant to agree to anything, 
but combined domestic pressures, especially an emerging public-health crisis caused by 
air pollution, and international pressure applied by the United States forced the Chinese 
hands.  In the United States, President Obama had to move aggressively, with stiff 
resistance from the US Congress and special interest groups, to take executive action 
that would reduce emissions and improve renewable energy.  However, after much 
deliberation, both sides came on board. 
 This agreement provided substantial momentum for UNFCCC COP XXI in 
Paris.  It showed that the United States and China, the two great polluters, were serious 
about addressing climate change.  Additionally, as both countries served the role of 
presumed leaders of the developed bloc and developing bloc respectively, this bilateral 
agreement helped bridge the gap and clear any mistrust between the two groups.  A 
comprehensive agreement was made in Paris in which every member state of UNFCCC 
pledged to meet specific emission reduction targets.  Additionally, the UNFCCC 
climate change regime would reconvene every five years to assess, and potentially 
improve upon, the pledges made in Paris.  Initial scientific analysis widely came to the 
conclusion that if the pledges made in Paris are met, global temperatures will hold 
below a 4 degrees Celsius rise, widely regarded as a catastrophic red line. 
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 There are a variety of reasons this new international climate change regime 
could fail.  In the 2016 US presidential elections, a number of candidates are 
diametrically opposed to the progress made by the Obama Administration.  The slowing 
Chinese economy will present a difficult policy challenge for the Chinese Communist 
Party going forward, and it is possible that they will backtrack on their pledges.  Either 
of these outcomes could unravel this regime.  While these negative developments are 
possible, one should remain cautiously optimistic.  The pace of geo-engineering 
research and development will help governments reduce emissions without reducing 
energy consumption.  More importantly, though, is the fact that the progress made in 
Paris is substantially greater than anything established before.  Without the US-China 
Climate Pact of November 2014, this would not be the case. 
 In sum, global temperatures are rising and there is strong evidence that the 
greenhouse gas effect is the cause of the problem and there is a consensus that action 
needs to be taken.  In recent years, the international community has begun taking steps 
to address the issue.  This thesis will examine and analyze how climate change emerged 
as a political issue, what has been done about climate change thus far, and what the 
future might hold with regards to climate change.  Specifically, this issue will be 
examined through the lenses of the United States and China, the two leading emitters of 
carbon dioxide and the two presumed leaders of the international system.  Chapter I 
will provide a scientific explanation as to why climate change is occurring, evidence as 
to how humans are responsible for climate change, and possible solutions for climate 
change.  Chapter II will examine climate change in the context of China, specifically its 
vulnerabilities, its responsibility for the issue, its past efforts to address the issue, and 
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its capabilities and motivations moving forward.  Chapter III will focus on the United 
States, including its vulnerabilities to climate change how it contributed to the issue, 
but most importantly will argue that the United States has and should continue to be a 
leader in environmental issues.  Chapter IV will explain and analyze the US-China 
Climate Pact in the context of past climate negotiations, and will argue that the Pact 
was an important step in alleviating past issues that caused political paralysis.  Chapter 
V will show why the Pact was so important, specifically with regards to its role in the 
successful completion of international climate negotiations at the Conference of Parties 
XXI in December 2015 in Paris, France. 
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Chapter I: A Primer on Climate Change 
Things are starting to heat up, and they are heating up fast.  2014 was the hottest 
year on record.  According to NASA, the world’s average annual temperature has been 
increasing since 1891, and shows no signs of slowing down.  To be precise, the average 
temperature of 2014 was 1.1 degrees Fahrenheit above the average for the whole average 
of the 20th century.1  This record-breaking year of rising temperatures was driven in part 
by massive spikes in temperatures in Europe, Australia, and western North America.  
Clearly, the world is getting hotter.  Compounding the issue is that the Earth is heating up 
at an alarming rate.  Fascinatingly, all of the ten hottest years on record have come since 
1998.  Additionally, the New York Times recently reported that 2015 is on pace to be 
even hotter than 2014.  These statistics beg the question – what is behind this trend of 
rising temperatures?2 
This chapter aims to provide an explanation as to why temperatures are rising so 
rapidly across the globe.  There is a comprehensive body of scientific evidence linking 
greenhouse gases, and most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2), to rising global 
temperatures.  Additionally, the source of much of the CO2 in Earth’s atmosphere seems 
to be from an uptick in human emissions, especially since the Industrial Revolution.  
Moreover, this rise in global temperatures has caused many negative effects to Earth’s 
climactic and ecological systems. 
 
                                                
1 Shaftel, Holly.  “Facts: Global Temperature.”  NASA.  Global Climate Change: Vital 
Signs of the Plantet.  2 March 2016.  Web. 
2 Gills, Justin.  “2015 Likely to Be Hottest Year Ever Recorded.”  The New York Times 
(New York City).  21 October 2015.  Web. 
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Carbon Dioxide and Temperature 
 Climate scientists have a plausible explanation for global warming.  In 1861, John 
Tyndall published lab results that identified carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas that 
absorbs heat rays.  Tyndall invented the device now referred to as a spectrophotometer, 
which is used to measure the degree to which gases absorb heat.  Tyndall’s experiments 
showed that water vapor, carbon dioxide, and ozone all absorb heat radiation.  At the 
time, Tyndall’s research was significant because it provided an explanation for how the 
Earth’s atmosphere retains heat.  Now, though, Tyndall’s conclusions have become the 
bedrock for explanations of the greenhouse gas effect – that is, an increase in the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere increases Earth’s temperature.  
His research, and the research of other important scientists, was reaffirmed and sharpened 
by the Swedish physicist Svante Arrhenius, who provided conclusive evidence in 1896 
that carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere had an impact on temperature.  Arrhenius 
concluded that the “temperature of the Arctic regions would rise about 8 or 9 degrees 
Celsius if the carbonic acid increased 2.5 to 3 times its present value.”  Although newer 
climate models have come to different conclusions about the scale of an impact on 
Earth’s temperature, what has not been overturned is Arrhenius’ basic premise that an 
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide would lead to an increase in the temperature on 
Earth’s surface.3  
  According to climate scientists Joseph F. Dimento and Pamela Doughman, the 
field of modern climate science began in 1958 when Charles David Keeling, a professor 
of oceanography at the University of California, San Diego, began to collect a continuous 
                                                
3 The Discovery of Global Warming: The Carbon Dioxide Greenhouse Gas Effect.”  
American Institute of Physics.  March 2015.  Web.   
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record of atmospheric carbon dioxide (an abundant greenhouse gas) concentrations from 
the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.4 Keeling’s basic observation was that there had 
been a spike in the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in Earth’s atmosphere over a 
fifty year period.  Interestingly enough, this spike in carbon dioxide concentration 
coincided with an increase in global temperatures.  Keeling’s observations will be 
explored more in depth later – for right now, the important point is that there has been, 
since the beginning of Keeling’s research, a correlation between a rise in carbon dioxide 
concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere and a rise in global annual average temperatures.  In 
fact, this correlation was present well before Keeling began doing research.  The graph 
below shoes the annual average global temperature (blue line) plotted against the carbon 
dioxide concentration in Earth’s atmosphere in parts per million (ppm, red line): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 DiMento, Joseph F. and Pamela Doughman.  Climate Change: What it Means for Us, 
Our Children, and Our Grandchildren.  Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007.  
Print. 
 
Courtesy of Lon Hocker, a guest contributor to Watts Up With That? 
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While temperature fluctuates in the short-term, in the long term it is on an upward 
trajectory in correlation with carbon dioxide.  This correlation has become especially 
strong since 1960.  Why, though, does carbon dioxide have an effect on temperature?  
Carbon dioxide is in a group of gases, known as greenhouse gases, that affect the way 
heat interacts with Earth’s atmosphere. 
 
Greenhouse Gases 
While there is a clear correlation between carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere 
and global temperature, causation is much trickier to explain.  There are a few prevailing 
schools of thought to explain the phenomenon.  The first explanation, and the most 
popular, is that a spike in human emissions since the Industrial Revolution has caused an 
increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere; that this 
increase in greenhouse gases has caused an increase in global temperatures, commonly 
described by the phrase ‘global warming’; and that this increase in global temperatures 
has had, and should continue to have, an effect on Earth’s climate, an effect referred to as 
‘climate change.’  The contrarians’ take on things holds those climate variations are much 
like climate variations in the past; and that humans are probably not causing the climate 
variations today, or that there is insufficient evidence for an impetus to change.  First, the 
latter argument will be examined in depth.  Following the layout of the ‘human caused 
climate change’ argument will be the ‘contrarians’ take,’ which is not an explanation as 
to why global temperatures are increasing so much as an explanation as to why the 
human caused climate change argument is wrong. 
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 Joseph F. DiMento and Pamela Doughman explain a natural process in which 
Earth’s atmosphere traps heat, heating Earth up enough to sustain life.4 There are two 
types of radiation responsible for heating Earth.  The first is solar radiation, produced by 
the burning of gases on the Sun.  The second is thermal radiation, heat given off by the 
Earth towards the atmosphere.  According to DiMento and Doughman, greenhouse gases 
act as a “one way mirror” because they trap solar and thermal radiation within Earth’s 
atmosphere.  The strength of this ‘mirror’ is relative to the concentration of Earth’s 
greenhouse gases.  That is to say, the more concentrated Earth’s gases are, the more 
radiation will be trapped.  Life on Earth, this argument would hold, was created with a 
relatively stable level of greenhouse gas concentration.  So, if greenhouse gas 
concentration is responsible for the temperature level of Earth, then a rise in the 
concentration of greenhouse gases could be responsible for a rise in Earth’s temperature.4 
 Fortunately, the concentration of greenhouse gases (measured in parts per million, 
or ppm) over the course of history is measurable, DiMento and Doughman note.  This is 
done through analysis of records in nature, for example in glaciers.4  But before delving 
into record analysis, it is important to understand what greenhouse gases are, how they 
are produced, and how they are eliminated. 
 There are many different greenhouse gases.  In order of most abundant to least 
abundant, greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere are comprised of water vapor, carbon 
dioxide (CO2), ozone, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), 
and carbon monoxide (CO).  According to DiMento and Doughman, the different 
greenhouse gases have different levels of efficiency in absorbing heat.  That is to say that 
some greenhouse gases have more of an impact on keeping heat in Earth’s atmosphere.  
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The efficiency of certain greenhouse gases in absorbing heat is measured by the GWP 
index.  The base unit for the GWP index is carbon, which is defined as one unit.  
Methane has a GWP index of twenty-one, so one unit of methane is equal to twenty-one 
units of the same mass of carbon.  For many climate scientists, CO2 remains the most 
important greenhouse gas in explaining human caused climate change.  This is a product 
of its abundance, its efficiency, its duration in the atmosphere, and that it is the chief 
human emission.  The duration of time a greenhouse gas is in Earth’s atmosphere is 
significant because if the human caused climate change hypothesis is correct, reducing 
greenhouse gas concentration will depend on how long it takes for a greenhouse gas to be 
eliminated from the atmosphere.  CO2 stays in Earth’s atmosphere for at least a couple of 
decades.   
 
Human Activity and CO2 
 So what human activities have an impact on CO2 concentrations in Earth’s 
atmosphere?  There are two critical systems that impact carbon dioxide concentrations in 
Earth’s atmosphere, as described by climate scientists Andrew Dessler and Edward 
Parson – sources and sinks.5 ‘Sources’ is a catchall phrase to describe any action that 
causes the emission of a greenhouse gas, (especially CO2) into Earth’s atmosphere.  
Sources include, but are not limited to, the burning of fossil fuels for manufacturing and 
automobile emissions.  ‘Sinks’ are systems on Earth that absorb greenhouse gases out of 
the atmosphere.  The chief sinks on Earth’s surface are trees, but all floras on Earth play 
                                                
5 Dessler, Andrew and Parson, Edward A.  The Science and Politics of Global Climate 
Change: A Guide to the Debate.  Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2010.  Print. 
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an important role in absorbing carbon from the atmosphere.  Human-caused climate 
change hypotheses would hold that the coupling of an increase in CO2 emissions 
stemming from the industrial revolution with the destruction of sinks through the process 
of deforestation have caused an intensification of the greenhouse gas effect to such a 
degree that it is causing our climate to change.  Essentially, an increase in sources and a 
decrease in sinks that has systematically occurred since the 19th century have thrown off 
Earth’s balance. 
 Human activity has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in greenhouse gases in 
Earth’s atmosphere.  Dessler and Parson describe this process succinctly: 
Over the past two centuries, human activities have sharply increased the atmospheric 
abundance of several greenhouse gases.  The most important increase has been CO2, 
which is emitted from burning fossil-fuel energy sources – coal, oil, and natural gas – and 
from land clearing and deforestation.   These CO2 emissions from human activities are 
superimposed on a natural global carbon cycle…   
 
Dessler and Parson’s work confirms that CO2 has been emitted into the atmosphere by 
human activity.  The industrial revolution brought about a phase in human existence in 
which resource combustion for energy production, specifically the burning of fossil fuels 
(coal, oil, natural gas, and wood), has been a principal driver of the global economy.  The 
adverse effects of energy usage are now becoming more and more clear as temperatures 
continue to rise, and the scientific link between CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere 
and temperature becomes better known.  
 CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas for our purposes because it is efficient 
at absorbing heat, remains in Earth’s atmosphere for a long time, and is the chief 
greenhouse gas emission from human activity.  All greenhouse gases play an important 
role in heating the Earth, but CO2 emissions are the principle culprit of global warming, 
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and humans have the most influence over CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere 
relative to other greenhouse gases.  
 Now a circle can be drawn back to Professor Keeling’s research.  Professor 
Keeling revealed that between 1958 and 2003, carbon concentration above his 
observatory in Hawaii increased from 316 ppm to 376 ppm, an increase of about 16% 
over 45 years.  DiMento and Doughman posit that for 420,000 years, up until the 
Industrial Revolution, CO2 levels hovered in-between 180 ppm and 280 ppm.4  This 
means that at the minimum, CO2 levels have risen from the Industrial Revolution by 
about 34%.  Moreover, DiMento and Doughman claim that CO2 often takes decades to 
leave Earth’s atmosphere.4  Accordingly, the upward slope in Hocker’s graph would 
suggest that the sudden increase in CO2 levels would stick around for decades to come, 
while additional cumulative CO2 emissions would contribute to existing CO2 in Earth’s 
atmosphere.  
 It is significant to note that there has been nothing to disprove the hypothesis that 
climate change is a human-caused issue.  In fact, it is a measurable fact that CO2 
concentrations have risen significantly with increases in human CO2 emissions, and that 
global temperatures have risen at a steady pace in accordance with increases in CO2 
concentrations.  This observable fact confirms a central argument in the human-caused 
climate change hypothesis.   
 
Change in Temperature 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a United Nations 
commissioned organization that studies climate change, its effects, and its potential 
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effects.  The IPCC is makes short- and long-term projections on a variety of ecological 
topics.  The IPCC is the main source for climate projections for many governments, and 
is often considered the most authoritative in the world.  The IPCC 2013 executive 
summary concludes, “the projected change in global mean surface air temperature will 
likely be in the range of 0.3 to 0.7 degrees Celsius (.54 to 1.26 degrees Fahrenheit).”6 
This prediction is described as being of ‘medium confidence’ and is barring any volcanic 
eruptions.  The long-term projection is for global temperatures to increase over the next 
century to century and a half by 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit).  The report 
notes that these temperature changes will vary by region, and the Arctic is the region of 
the world most susceptible to temperature increases.  This is important because the Arctic 
is largely a massive block of ice, and the melting of this ice will raise sea levels.  These 
changes in temperature would have a profound impact on Earth’s ecological systems. 
 
Ecological Impact 
One of the most serious issues today is a rising sea level.  As argued in a 1987 
article by Richard Monastersky, a writer for Science News, rising sea levels will have a 
major, and overwhelmingly negative, impact on Earth’s ecology.  Monastersky, citing 
research by a group of British university biologists, posited that over the next forty years 
average sea level would rise by 4 to 8 centimeters.7  Monastersky’s predictions may have 
been confirmed by recent scientific research.  Dashiell Hammet, a climate scientist, 
                                                
6 Stocker, Thomas F; Qin, Dahe.  “Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis.”  
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.  Web. 
7 Monastersky, Richard.  “Rising Sea Levels: Predictions and Plans.”  Science News 
132.21(1987): 326. 
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confirms that for much of the 21st century, average seal levels have risen between 2.8 to 
7.7 millimeters per year - meaning at the bare minimum, it would take three and a half 
years for average sea level to rise by 1 centimeter.8   
According to Howard Friel, an independent author and scholar, the rise in sea 
levels is caused by a few factors, and these factors are unlikely to change anytime soon.  
In assigning responsibility for rising sea levels, Friel implicates the shrinking of land ice, 
releasing water into the ocean.9  DiMento and Doughman concur with Friel’s assessment, 
and claim that as ocean temperatures rise, warm water expands.  With nowhere to go, 
warm water goes up, increasing the potential for powerful storms and higher tides.  Also, 
rising sea levels can cause saltwater intrusions that contaminate groundwater used for 
drinking and irrigation.   Additionally, the ocean absorbs CO2 from the atmosphere.  With 
an increase of atmospheric CO2, the ocean has been absorbing an unsustainable amount 
of CO2, causing the acidity level of the oceans to rise.  This has damaged the ecology of 
the ocean because acidity impairs the ability of coral reefs and shelled organisms to form 
skeletons and shells.4 
 Dessler and Parson argue that rising temperatures have profound effects beyond 
Earth’s water.  An increase in temperatures on the ground has increased permafrost 
melting, causing severe damage to local ecosystems and infrastructure.  Earth’s life 
systems are being negatively affected as well.  Increasing temperature levels have forced 
many species to migrate to higher latitudes or risk extinction, Dessler and Parson claim.  
                                                
8 Hammet, Dashiell.  “Sea Level.”  Real Climate: Climate Science from Climate 
Scientists.  14 October 2012.  Web. 
9 Friel, Howard.  “On Melting Glaciers and Rising Sea Levels.”  The Lomborg 
Deception: Setting the Record Straight about Global Warming.  New Haven: Yale 
University Press (2010): 90-116. 
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There is a broad de-synchronization of life-cycle events, such as bird migrations, caused 
by increasing temperatures.  Woodlands have been changing; as trees cannot survive in 
increasingly warm areas – this problem is also reducing the earths sink systems.5   
 Humans have been negatively affected by climate change as well.  Global 
warming has negatively impacted food production – rising temperatures have contributed 
to reduced yields, increased necessity of irrigation, planting and harvesting changes, 
decreased arability, and an increase in pests.  A more pressing concern for today is not 
the threat to human life, but rather the costs that are incurred because of a changing 
climate.  Sea level rises, floods, droughts, and wildfires all damage infrastructure and 
property – and most of the time taxpayers are the ones who foot the bill for repairs.  
Disruptions to daily life reduce productivity, impair trade, and reduce tourism, amongst 
other negative economic consequences.  Global warming is increasing the number of 
‘climate refugees’ – and although this is a slow-moving disaster, economic costs are 
inevitable.6  
 
The Contrarian’s Take 
An overwhelming consensus is emerging on the matter.  The scientific 
community increasingly supports human-caused climate change hypotheses.  NASA cites 
18 scientific associations, including scientific societies, scientific academies, 
intergovernmental bodies, and U.S. government agencies, as overwhelmingly supporting 
human-caused climate change hypotheses as scientifically verified.10 A Skeptical Science 
                                                
10  “Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming.”  NASA.  Web.  1 November 2015 
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ 
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peer reviewed survey found that of over 12,000 peer-reviewed abstracts written between 
1991 and 2011 on the subject, 97% took a position agreeing with human-caused climate 
change hypotheses.11 The consensus amongst scientists is becoming so overwhelming 
that it is to the point where the human-caused climate change hypothesis becomes as 
much of an understood scientific truth as evolution. However, counterarguments are not 
necessarily of malign intent, and they are worth evaluating.   
One of the most common counterarguments to the human-caused climate change 
hypothesis is that global temperatures inexplicably stopped rising for a few years between 
2007 and 2012.  How, some argued, could CO2 concentrations have an impact on global 
temperatures if carbon emissions increased, but global temperatures decreased.  For a 
fleeting moment, this counterargument seemed to have some weight to it.  However, two 
issues remain with this counterargument.  The first is that it is false in the long-term.  As 
is clearly shown in Hocker’s graph, global temperatures have fluctuated up and down 
while CO2 concentrations have increased, but as a general trend, global temperatures 
have increased substantially over the course of decades – weather is short-term, while 
climate is long-term.  The second issue with this counterargument is that even as a 
shortsighted argument, it no longer carries weight because in recent years temperatures 
have shot up considerably in recent years.2 To any impartial observer, a trend of upward 
temperature recordings is as clear as day.  Any efforts to try to debunk human-caused 
climate change hypotheses by claiming that temperatures have not increased are wrong. 
                                                
11 “The 97% consensus on Global Warming.”  Skeptical Science.  30 May 2014.  Web.  1 
November 2015.  https://www.skepticalscience.com/global-warming-scientific-
consensus-intermediate.htm 
 
 20 
 A much more compelling contrarian argument is that over the course of history 
global temperatures have varied widely regardless of the impact of humans.  According 
to DiMento and Doughman, these arguments are based off of data obtained through 
proxy indicators, a term used to identify ‘natural’ recording systems of the past, such as 
sediments, ice cores, tree rings, and corals (37).  The natural cycles argument is a very 
compelling one.  For example, according to DiMento and Doughman, 50 million years 
ago temperature levels were estimated to have been 12 degrees Fahrenheit higher than 
they are now, with CO2 levels approximately three times higher than they are today (38).  
To be sure, this phenomenon begs the question – how did CO2 levels get so high without 
human activity?  There is a flawed logic to using this as a counterexample of human-
caused climate change hypotheses.  To say that because there was a natural variation of 
temperature and CO2 levels in past millennia discredits human-caused climate change 
hypotheses is a fallacious statement because these two phenomena are not exclusive of 
one another. Indeed, this historical anecdote may reinforce human-caused climate change 
hypotheses because it reinforces the linkage between CO2 levels and temperature 
increases.  A natural spike in CO2 and temperature levels could be explained by massive 
natural disasters, such as meteor impact or massive deforestation by way of fire.  What is 
clear is that something traumatic occurred that threw off the natural balance of sources 
and sinks on Earth, a trend that is not unlike what is being observed today.  The only 
difference is that human-caused climate change hypotheses claim the external shock to 
Earth’s natural systems is the inorganic process of a spike in carbon emissions caused by 
human activity. 
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 Another popular strategy for debating by the contrarian is to bring into question 
the science of climate change.  They will argue that the scientific evidence is 
inconclusive, or will go as far as claiming that scientific research on the topic is alarmist 
and incorrect.  So, how can one be so sure the science is correct? 
 
How We Know Its Real 
 Naomi Oreskes, a scientists and historian at Harvard University, lays out a 
compelling argument as to why we can trust climate science.12  Firstly, Oreskes argues 
that climate science, because of its highly political nature, is one of the most publicly 
debated and studied biological and geological sciences, and has been for some time.  
Since the late 1980s, Oreskes points out, scientists have taken great pains to examine, and 
to attempt to disprove, man-made climate change hypotheses.13  As has already been 
discussed, the result of this decade’s long scientific debate has been the emergence of a 
scientific consensus – by some estimates 97% of peer-reviewed climate science 
publications support human-caused climate change hypotheses. 
 Oresken makes another important point – many of the predictions made by 
climate scientists over the years have come true.  Chief among these predictions has been 
global warming.  Climate scientists have predicted that global temperatures would rise, 
albeit to different degrees, and global temperatures have in fact risen.  Oresken traces 
back global warming predictions (and accompanying sea level rise predictions) to 1965.  
Since then, Oresken points out that comprehensive computer-based climate change 
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models have been developed.  These computer models, many of which were developed in 
the early 2000s, serve the basis for climate change predictions for various climate 
scientists and organizations, and continue to correctly, at least to a certain degree, predict 
the consequences of global warming. 
 While Oresken acknowledges that man-made climate change hypotheses, much 
like other scientific subjects, cannot be ‘proven.’  But a preponderance of evidence 
allows for inferences to the best explanation.  The scientific community has 
overwhelmingly inferred that man-made climate change hypotheses are credible and 
reliable.  Indeed, man-made climate change hypotheses over the course of scientific study 
have gone from being a possible explanation to a probable explanation. 
   
The Cost-Benefit Burden 
Climate change is not simply a scientific question, though.  There is an economic 
and historical aspect to the issue as well.  A set of complaints comes from rapidly 
industrializing countries like China and India.  Although these industrializing countries 
tend to be the biggest source of CO2 emissions in the world today, they argue that the 
developed world (for example, the United States, Europe, etc.…) have been responsible 
for the great majority of emissions over the course of history, and therefore these 
countries are responsible for climate change experienced today, according to 
Bloomberg’s Reed Landberg and Natalie Obiko Pearson.14 There is a lot of truth to this 
argument.  In fact, today’s industrialized countries did contribute to the issue today in 
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much more substantial ways than developing countries.  This is a simple reflection of the 
amount of time industrialized countries carelessly emitted CO2.  Now that the 
development stage is over for many of these industrialized countries, the economic and 
social costs of moving to a low-emissions economy is smaller relative to developing 
countries.  It is a reasonable, though not necessarily morally proper, argument that if 
industrialized countries carelessly emitted to lift their massive populations out of poverty, 
then currently developing countries should have every right to do the same.  Despite 
these disputes, industrializing countries have gone as far as acknowledging that the 
problem does exist, so much so that they are willing to enter into negotiations on the 
topic.   
If the argument against acting on human-caused climate change from inside 
developing countries wasn’t enough, there is also an argument against acting on human-
caused climate change from inside industrialized countries.  Organizations and think 
tanks like the Heritage Foundation argue that the economic costs to the American citizen 
of emission-reduction policies outweigh the potential benefits of those policies, and are 
therefore not worth pursuing. 15  These same arguments can be applied to other 
industrialized countries.  Moreover, some business groups like the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce see U.S. pressure on developing countries to reduce CO2 emissions as 
potentially harmful to U.S. trade.  These arguments hold that imposing emission- 
reduction policies in developing countries will stunt growth, make exports from these 
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countries more expensive, hold millions of people down under the poverty line, and 
reduce global economic growth. 
 Truth be told, there is validity to all of these arguments.  Reducing emissions is 
not a costless process.  So, if climate change is to be addressed, what are some 
economically viable ways to do so? 
 
The Importance of Sinks, Geo-Engineering, and Renewable Technology 
 Simply reducing energy consumption is a difficult task.  Every country relies on 
energy consumption for economic growth.  Therefore, reducing energy consumption 
would necessarily impede economic growth.  But there are ways to reduce emissions 
without reducing energy consumption. 
 Natural sinks and artificial sink technology could play a critical role in combating 
climate change for years to come.  Barry V. Rolett, a biologist at the University of 
Hawaii, argues that deforestation has occurred throughout the history of the world in a 
major way, but that this is a reversible trend.  Rolett claims that reforestation agendas 
would profoundly benefit the environment.16  Greenhouse gas absorption from natural 
reforestation can be supplemented by artificial sink technology.  Marilyn Brown and 
Benjamin Sovacool, two co-authors and climate engineers, point out that advancements 
in CO2 capture and sequestration technology are being made.17  Existing technology is 
able to capture emissions before they enter Earth’s atmosphere and siphon them into 
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Earth’s crust and mantle where they sit until they dissipate.  Greenhouse gases under the 
Earth’s surface have no impact on the greenhouse gas effect.  Research and development 
will allow these ‘carbon capture facilities’ to be much more effective in the future.   
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, there is an issue.  Global average temperatures are rising because of the 
greenhouse gas effect.  The chief culprit of the greenhouse gas effect seems to be man-
made CO2 emissions, caused mostly by the spike in the burning of fossil fuels for energy 
production since the Industrial Revolution.  Additionally, a group of developed countries 
seem to be responsible for the lion’s share of emissions throughout history, while some 
developing countries have recently surpassed the developed countries in terms of annual 
emissions.  There is an issue, and everyone is responsible, though some are more 
responsible for the problem than others. 
The question then becomes – what can be done about this issue?  In the next 
chapters, this question will be addressed through the lens of the two countries with the 
largest CO2 emissions in the world, China and the United States.  US and China struck an 
agreement in November of 2014 to curb and reduce CO2 emissions.  How this deal was 
struck, and whether its provisions are sufficient, and the goals of the agreement will be 
examined further. 
The second chapter will focus on China.  What are the effects and potential 
effects of climate change on China?  Why is energy consumption so high in China?  If 
possible, can CO2 emissions be reduced?  Why or why not is this possible?  In the third 
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chapter, these same issues will be addressed, but instead they will be addressed in the 
context of the United States. 
The fourth chapter will focus on climate negotiations between the two countries. 
How did these two countries come to the negotiating table?  What were the goals on both 
sides during the negotiations?  How did the negotiations play out?  What will the effects 
be of the agreement, and are they sufficient in solving this problem? 
The fifth chapter will put take the pact and put it in a larger context.  How has the 
pact impacted international climate negotiations?  Will the pact be significant enough to 
address this issue?  Specifically, were both US and China successful at meeting their 
goals through negotiations?  As has been established, climate change is a serious 
problem, and is likely not to solve itself.  It is time for world powers to step up and take 
leadership on this issue.  How does the US-China Climate Pact stack up? 
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Chapter II: China and Climate Change 
 Zhen Guogang, China’s top meteorological official, recently remarked that 
climate change could have a “huge impact” on China, according to the BBC.18  Zhen 
warns that climate change could reduce crop yields, increase droughts, intensify 
rainstorms, raise temperatures, and prove disastrous to big infrastructure projects.  This is 
a major admission from a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official, and should serve as a 
huge red flag.  However, things are not so simple.  China is the one of the world’s largest 
economies and has for the past decades been one of the world’s manufacturing 
powerhouses.  This has come at the price of being the top emitter of CO2 in the world.  
All of this is in the context of rapid economic development that has lifted millions of 
people out of poverty.   
 The story of China’s rapid economic ascent is intertwined with the exorbitant rise 
in its CO2 emissions.  An important question is China’s willingness to deal with the 
problem.  Equally as important is whether or not China is capable of dealing with the 
problem.  What implications do China’s willingness and capabilities have on the broader 
challenge of climate change? 
 
Effects, and Potential Effects, of Climate Change on China  
 According to Elisa Chih-Yin Lai of the Wilson Center, since the 19th century 
surface air temperature has increased in China by 0.5-0.8 degrees Celsius (0.9-1.4 
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degrees Fahrenheit).19  This rise in temperatures has an impact on glaciers, causing them 
to melt.  The melting of glaciers will have an especially profound impact on China 
because of its vast Pacific coastline and extensive network of lakes and rivers.  According 
to Lai, glacial melting in China will cause flooding from glacial lakes into the upper 
reaches of the Yangtze River in the short-term, and a lower volume of water in the 
Yangtze’s downstream areas in the long-term (because of depreciating water sources in 
the long-term).  Glacial lake flooding causes large-scale flooding and mudslides in 
mountainous areas, especially in areas close to the southwest border with Nepal.  
Moreover, runoff water from glacial areas has supplied the Yangtze River and Yellow 
River with a steady source of water for centuries, but shrinking glaciers can no longer be 
relied upon to supply these rivers.  
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Scientists predict that one-third of crucial glacial areas will disappear by 2050, and half 
will disappear by 2090.  Glacial shrinking poses a serious long-term threat to Chinese 
water sources and to the ecological systems connected to them, Lai argues.   
If this wasn’t enough, rising sea levels also threaten China.  The average sea level 
along the Chinese coast has increased by 90 mm (3 inches) over the past 30 years.19  This 
sea level rise is in the context of a rapidly urbanizing population, especially in cities 
along China’s coast.  Cities oftentimes experience higher sea level rises because of the 
extraction of groundwater, decreasing the land’s load carrying capacity and accelerating 
land sinking.  These factors threaten major Chinese cities, such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
and Tianjin.  These three cities combine to have almost 30 million people, close to the 
population of all of Canada.  All of these cities have undergone major infrastructural 
makeovers in past decades, with the Chinese government and private investors dumping 
billions of dollars into building projects.  Alas, rising sea levels threaten this critical 
infrastructure. 
According to Lai, Chinese biodiversity is also threatened in a major way.  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has assessed that if global 
temperatures were to raise 1.5-2.5 degrees Celsius (2.7-4.5 degrees Fahrenheit), around 
20 to 30 percent of global species will face extinction.6  The threat to biodiversity in 
China is especially sharp with regards to China’s primates, because rainfall in these 
species’ natural habitats has decreased, causing a degradation of habitats and a reduction 
in food sources, chief among them bamboo.  Additionally, rises in ocean temperatures 
and the change in pH values in seawaters threaten coral reefs in the South China Sea.  
CO2 also causes acidification of coral reefs, slowing coral growth and causing coral 
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calcification.  Coral reefs serve as a home to over 4,000 fish species.  Damage to coral 
reefs seriously throws off the ecological balance of marine life.   
Climate change is also causing an increase in natural disasters in China, and this 
trend can be expected to continue.  The IPCC has concluded that climate change has 
contributed to a spike in heat waves, tropical cyclones, droughts, intense rainfall, 
thunderstorms, snow avalanches, and dust storms.  The problem is especially acute on 
China’s coast, where increases in sea temperatures result in more powerful tropic 
cyclones, causing extensive damage to property and threatening human life.  Moreover, 
natural disasters are becoming more unpredictable and devastating, according to IPCC 
reports.  Floods and droughts also disturb agricultural cycles.  Drought is an especially 
thorny issue in China, because it is very difficult to feed an impoverished population of 
1.357 billion people.  Drought causes food scarcity and raises food prices, so there is not 
only less food to go around, but it also is becoming more expensive.  According to the 
World Bank, 480 million Chinese (40% of its population) live in regions currently facing 
water scarcity issues.  The U.N. and World Bank expect the severity of droughts in China 
to increase in the next fifty years.19 
It is clear then, that climate change is having a profound impact on China.  It is 
important to note is that China is the biggest contributor to the climate change problem 
today.  It is by far the largest emitter of CO2 in the world – granted, China in aggregate 
over history has not emitted nearly as much CO2 as European countries or the US.  With 
that being said, China has the most work to do in confronting the issue as most 
industrialized countries have taken great strides to reduce their CO2 emissions.  So, how 
big of an emitter is China, and why? 
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Economic History of China 
According to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, China has been the 
largest greenhouse gas emitter since 2006.20  Most of these greenhouse gas emissions are 
in the form of CO2, the main emission from the burning of fossil fuels.  China’s high 
emission levels stem from the massive size, and massive growth level, of its economy. 
According to the World Bank, China had an average growth rate of 10% between 
2000 and 2011.  Between 2011 and 2015, average growth hovered well above 7%.  Even 
as China’s economy is in ‘slowdown’ mode, it is still expected to see average growth of 
well over 5% for at least the next decade.  China’s economy is powered by a massive 
population of over 1.36 billion people, many of them moving to metro areas where labor 
is in high demand.21 
The Chinese economy is an ever-evolving system. The Qing Dynasty fell in 1912 
after decades of Western imperialism wreaked havoc on Chinese society.  Following the 
collapse of the Qing, the Japanese took advantage of the power vacuum in China - in part 
by the desire to power its own economic engine with China’s natural resources - and 
colonized the country until the end of World War II.  After World War II, years of civil 
war followed, fought between the nationalist Guomindang government led by Chiang 
Kai-Shek and the communist insurgency led by Mao Zedong.  Mao eventually defeated 
Chiang and banished his nationalist forces to the small coastal island of Taiwan and 
successfully established a permanent, sovereign state.  
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Barry Naughton, a Chinese scholar and political economist, highlights three major 
eras of the modern Chinese economy.22  The first is described as the Socialist Era (1949-
1978).  This period involved heavy industrial development and a centrally planned 
economy.  The second era is called the Market Transition Era, led by Deng Xiaoping, 
beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In this period, CCP leadership led the 
Chinese economy in opening itself up to capital from other countries.  While this period 
ended in 1993, it led directly to the Modern Era of the Chinese economy – and, 
importantly, the problem. 
 
China’s Energy Consumption 
 The present day Chinese economy is characterized by energy-intensive heavy 
industrial production for domestic use and export.  The specifics of where energy 
resources are used in China’s economy will be reviewed in a future section of this 
chapter.  For right now, though, it is important to understand the basic generalities of 
what China’s economy is.  
 China’s economy is centered on production.  The primary, and most energy-
intensive sector of the economy is the production of materials for infrastructure, such as 
steel, iron, and cement.22  China’s rapidly growing economy has required the 
development of a self-sustaining infrastructure material production sector.  Additionally, 
economies of scale have allowed the infrastructural materials sector to become 
internationally competitive, and China has become one of the world’s lead exporters of 
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goods for infrastructure.  Another major sector of China’s economy has been as an 
assembly hub for popular technology products.  Technology assembly is by nature more 
of a labor-intensive industry, but it also require a lot of electrical energy, which is 
powered by the burning of fossil fuels.  Moreover, China has a booming automobile 
industry, both in terms of domestic supply and demand.  More and more of China’s 1.3 
billion citizens are buying cars, and emissions from vehicles have a disastrous effect on 
climate change.23 
 All of this is important, because one cannot expect China to cut emissions without 
reforming the sectors of the economy that are responsible for most of the energy 
consumption in the country.  However, what first needs to be established is what kinds of 
resources power the Chinese economy.  There are three principal sources of energy used 
in China – coal, oil, and natural gas.   
 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has compiled a variety of 
statistics about energy consumption in China.24  According to the EIA, in 2012 coal 
supplied almost 66% of total energy consumption.  This amounted to around 80% of total 
CO2 emissions from China.  Coal is by far the dominant source of energy in China, a 
particularly problematic fact given that coal produces more CO2 emissions per unit of 
energy produced than all other forms of energy, including oil and natural gas.  To reduce 
its CO2 emissions, China will need to wean itself off of coal and begin using more 
sustainable energy sources.  This will be difficult, though.  Coal is a tempting source of 
energy for the Chinese – it is an abundant domestic product with well-established 
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infrastructure for transportation.  Simply stated, coal is so popular in China because it is 
cheap and easy to get.  The coal industry also rests in a unique position in Chinese 
politics, and has repeatedly presented roadblocks to reform – this topic will be discussed 
in-depth later in the chapter.  Essentially, the main source of China’s emission woes is its 
overreliance on coal.  Whether or not China is able to diversify its energy consumption in 
the future will decide the fate of China’s climate change reform policies.22  
 Oil accounts for almost 20% of total energy consumption in China.24  China has 
vast offshore oil reserves, but is using up these reserves at an alarming rate.  China’s 
reserve-to-production ratio is 11, whereas the world average is 40.22  This means that for 
every unit of oil produced in China, there are 11 units of verified reserves.  This statistic 
is calculated on an annual basis.  Essentially, this statistic means that if no new oil 
reserves were discovered or verified, and China produced oil at a steady rate, it would run 
out of oil reserves in eleven years.  While new oil reserves are constantly being 
discovered and verified, China’s low reserve-to-production ratio relative to the global 
average is a major cause for concern.  China’s ratio has contributed to its reliance on coal 
because it impedes flexibility in energy diversification.  Part of China’s strategy to 
combat this issue has for its national oil companies (NOCs) to acquire overseas oil 
reserves.  According to the IEA, NOCs have purchased assets in the Middle East, North 
America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia and invested an estimated $73 billion between 
2011 and 2013.  One of the main problems of importing oil from NOC overseas assets, 
though, is it comes at a comparatively high cost relative to coal – again, for production 
firms in China, coal remains the most attractive source of energy.  With that being said, 
plummeting oil prices may soon buck this trend. 
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 Whereas oil is a decreasingly attractive alternative to coal for China, gas is 
becoming more and more attractive, Barry Naughton argues.22 Gas, like oil, is a low-
emission fossil fuel relative to coal.  Additionally, China has large natural gas reserves, 
and has a massive land border with Russia, the world’s top natural gas producer.  
Moreover, China’s natural gas industry is becoming more and more developed with time.  
China is the 6th largest gas producer in the world, and ranks 13th in natural gas reserves 
with 3.1 trillion cubic meters of verified reserves (compared to 48.7 trillion cubic meters 
in Russia, 9.86 trillion cubic meters in the U.S., and 1.798 trillion cubic meters in 
Kuwait).  China produced 112 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2013, so its natural 
gas reserve-to-production ratio is roughly 27, substantially higher than its oil reserve-to-
production ratio.  Moreover, it only imported 52 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 
2013, less than half of its total domestic production, in stark contrast with oil production 
in which imports far outstrip exports.22  For China, the way forward for diversification 
may be in the realm of natural gas, as China hopes to double its total energy consumption 
from natural gas by 2020, from 5% to 10%.   
That is, at least in the short-term – the long-term solution is in renewables and 
nuclear energy, industries in which China is underdeveloped.  According to IEA 
statistics, renewables and nuclear energy account for only about 10% of total energy 
consumption in China (8% by hydro sources, 1% by renewables, and 1% by nuclear).  
While China can use its oil and natural gas reserves as a crutch for short-term energy 
diversification, the low reserve-to-production ratios for both of these resources means 
that domestic production cannot be solely relied upon to power China’s economy.  
Moreover, oil and natural gas imports are not a long-term solution because their prices 
 36 
will always be higher than domestic coal.  Therefore, it is imperative that China develops 
its renewable and nuclear industries for long-term energy production. 
 
Sources of Energy Consumption 
 There are three primary drivers of China’s skyrocketing energy consumption.  
The good news is that none of these drivers are irreversible or unchangeable, and good 
policy can transform each industry.  The bad news, though, is that given economic 
realities, reform will be extremely difficult and unlikely to be fully realized.  So, what are 
these drivers of energy consumption increases in China? 
 The first major driver of energy consumption in China has been the major 
increase in car sales.  Since the beginning of the 21st century, the accumulation of wealth 
in China has enabled millions of people to become car owners.25  There are many positive 
effects of car ownership – car sales stimulate the national economy, transportation 
becomes easier and more affordable, and cross provincial trade is improved by the 
abundance of commercial vehicles.  However, the major rise in the number of 
automobiles in China has led to an increase in CO2 emissions in the country.  Exhaust 
from the fuel that cars burn contributes to the atmosphere’s collection of greenhouse 
gases.  CO2 is the primary emission from automobile exhaust – additionally, other 
greenhouse gases, such as methane, are emitted from vehicles.23 To compound the issue 
of exhaust emissions, the production of cars also contributes to the issue.  In China, a 
booming domestic automobile industry has increased the contribution of industrial 
production emissions in China, a topic that will be explored further briefly. 
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 China’s automobile market has exploded in recent years, the product of a massive 
population rising out of poverty at a stunning rate.  According to Statista, since 2008, car 
sales in China have grown on average by more than 20% per year.  There has been over a 
150% increase in total car sales in China since 2008.25  With more and more people in 
China buying cars, CO2 emissions from automobile exhaust in the country have 
skyrocketed.  This trend is not likely to change anytime soon.  According to the Wall 
Street Journal, many foreign auto companies are taking steps to make their cars more 
abundantly available and cheaper in China.  Lowering the price of automobiles will raise 
the number of cars demanded, and put more cars on the road.  Moreover, more Chinese 
citizens are expected to want cars in the coming years, as China is expected to surpass the 
U.S. in the number of motor-vehicle drivers (set to pass the 300 million people mark) 
within the near future.  In China, a country of 1.3 billion people, it is unlikely that the 
growth in the demand for automobiles will slow anytime soon.  
 The second major source in the spike for energy in China has come from the use 
of coal to heat households.  While heating has historically been a priority for Chinese 
households, even before CO2 emissions became a major problem in the country, this 
issue is being compounded by a few factors today.  Essentially, rising incomes for 
Chinese households has led to increased spending on coal for household heating.  In the 
past, households have had to ration energy consumption for heating because of income 
pressures.  Additionally, because of a lack of purchasing power, households would often 
resort to supplying their own heating source – for example, households would chop their 
own wood.  But rising incomes has given Chinese households more time for leisure as 
they have turned to purchases of coal for heating sources.   Moreover, rising incomes 
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have also decreased rationing of burning coal – as incomes have risen, households have 
increased their discretionary spending on coal for heating houses, mostly because heat is 
a primary concern of households.  While it would seem that switching to oil burning for 
household heating would be popular, this has not been the case thus far because, as has 
been thoroughly discussed, the low price of coal has maintained its steady use.  For these 
reasons, household coal burning for heating has been a major factor in CO2 use.22 
 The final, and the most important, source in the rise in energy consumption in 
China has been the spike in industrial production – electricity generation and heavy-
industry production.  These energy demands have been driven by Chinese infrastructural 
development, demand for Chinese infrastructural exports, and the growth of Chinese 
factories.  Additionally, these sectors are the most difficult for China to reform.   
 
The Chinese Industrial Engine 
 The primary driver of the spike in energy consumption in China has been its 
astronomical rise as an industrial powerhouse.  China’s industrial sector, as measured by 
the Industrial Production Index (IPI), has boomed unlike any other country over the past 
century.  The IPI is a measure of industrial output that includes manufacturing, mining, 
and utilities.  China’s IPI has had a magnificent surge, especially since Deng Xiaoping’s 
market reforms of the 1980s, as shown on the next page courtesy of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis:26 
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In this graph, the China’s 2011 IPI is used as a baseline value of 100, and each year since 
1950 is compared relative to that 2011 value.  While services comprise most of the GDP 
of developed countries, industrial production has a unique place in China because of its 
place in the global manufacturing chain, and how that manufacturing is brought about.  
China hopes to transform itself into a services economy in the future – a serious cause for 
optimism about the prospects for it cutting its emissions.  However, this task is easier said 
than done, and even if China were to cut down its manufacturing production, it would 
likely just shift to another area in the world.  This, however, is a topic of discussion for 
another paper. 
 China became the manufacturing capital of the world during the 1980s because of 
a massive labor force, weak workplace regulations (especially wage laws), and a low 
valued currency.  To power this manufacturing economy utilities services were 
demanded, especially electricity.  Electricity in China, as we have already seen, has been 
and still is largely powered by the burning of coal.  The first stage of Chinese 
manufacturing in the 1980s was relatively low-energy intensive, but as the Chinese 
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workforce has become more sophisticated, and the Chinese economy has developed, 
manufacturing in China has taken a high-tech, heavy industrial character.  This is to say 
that at first, most Chinese manufacturing involved textiles.  Since then, though, China has 
primarily manufactured goods to build infrastructure, such as cement and steel, and 
technologically advanced products, such as smartphones and automobiles.  The main 
input in these processes are not human labor, as is the case in textile manufacturing, but 
rather raw goods.   
 Heavy industry is more energy intensive, requiring more mining.  This has 
strengthened the coal sector in China – it has simultaneously increased the reliance of the 
Chinese economy on coal while increasing economies of scale for coal producers.  Then, 
the changing character of Chinese manufacturing, in addition to the increase in Chinese 
manufacturing, has created a self-feeding cycle of an increasing IPI.  Manufactures need 
more and more raw goods, and utilities companies need more and more energy sources.  
This strengthens the hand of coal producers, increasing profitability, improving 
economies of scale leading to a cheaper product, and allowing them to have a more 
powerful position in the Chinese economy, and therefore importantly a more powerful 
position in Chinese society.  This point will be discussed shortly, but first it is worth 
discussing that while industrial production has increased, the efficiency of energy burning 
in China has been lackluster.   
 Exacerbating the issue in China is that it uses energy very inefficiently.  This is to 
say that in China, it takes a lot of energy to produce each dollar’s worth of GDP, 
especially relative to other countries.   This probably has much to do with the combined 
factors of high industrial production and overwhelming coal usage.  In China, it takes 
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0.24 kilograms of oil (KOE) to produce $1 of GDP.  This is compared to a value of 0.155 
in Japan, 0.14 in the United Kingdom, and 0.23 in the United States.  These values were 
produced by the International Monetary Fund and are based on data from 1995-2005.  It 
would not seem, then, that China’s situation is all too dire – their energy efficiency for oil 
burning is pretty much on par with the many developed countries.  The problem is that 
China uses over 3 times more coal than the second highest global coal consumer, the 
United States.  Additionally, China burns more coal than the next 49 coal consuming 
countries combined, according to 2011 statistics provided by the Europe’s Energy 
Portal.27  China’s reliance on coal is dragging down China’s economy, and at the same 
time producing more CO2 emissions in a vicious cycle – coal is less efficient, so more of 
it has to be burned than other fossil fuels, producing more CO2 than would be the case if 
oil was the predominant energy form. 
 While China may be moving towards a more efficient economy, there are some 
major causes for pessimism as to whether or not China will be able to reform.  The first is 
that the major source of China’s woes comes from its place on the international supply 
chain.  China is a major industrial producer for much of the world.  It will therefore be 
difficult for China’s emissions to suddenly stop.  Either China will have to continue to be 
a major industrial hub, with high emissions, hoping that geo-engineering will help put 
Band-Aids on the problem.  Or, China will transform its economy to a services based 
economy, a stated goal of the Chinese Communist Party.  While this might reduce 
Chinese emissions, it will not solve the problem – one must consider why China is such a 
major manufacturing hub.  China is not producing so much in a vacuum; rather demand 
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for high-tech goods from the developed world and infrastructure from all over the world 
creates the necessity for major suppliers.  These suppliers will tend to be underdeveloped 
countries – Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia; and African 
countries such as Nigeria and Mozambique.  Will these countries be able to produce 
goods more efficiently and with less CO2 emissions than China?  So, it then seems that 
the world is stuck between a rock and a hard place – either China continues to be a major 
manufacturing hub, and hopes that technology helps to alleviate the problem, or it simply 
punts the issue to another country.  Therein lies the major problem for the world.  What, 
though, is the major problem for China?  The answer is making Chairman Mao roll over 
in his grave. 
 
An Authoritarian’s Nightmare – Entrenched Coal Interests 
 The Chinese government has targeted the coal industry for reforms for a long 
time, and was hoping to reform the industry well before climate change became a 
pressing issue.  Much of the coal resources in China are owned by township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), a form of state-ownership at the local level.  In the 1990s, it was 
becoming clear that these TVEs were doing a poor job – workplace safety was a spot of 
international embarrassment, and the quality of coal that TVEs were producing was 
abhorrent, contributing to the pollution issue in urban areas.  For this reason, in 1997 the 
Chinese central government attempted to enact a ‘close the pits’ initiative, in which the 
rights to coal mine production were shifted from TVEs to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).  After shifting coalmines from TVEs to SOEs, the logic went, the central 
government would have flexibility to close mines it saw as unattractive, and to improve 
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the coal production process, making it safer and cleaner.  Things, however, did not go as 
planned. 
This initiative to switch ownership of coalmines from TVEs to SOEs hit two 
major roadblocks that prevented policy implementation.  The first of these roadblocks 
was the sudden surge in the demand for energy caused by an unplanned spike in 
industrial output at the turn of the century.  This phenomenon eliminated any flexibility 
that the central government had in reforming its energy industry because it suddenly 
needed copious amounts of energy to maintain soaring economic growth.  The second 
factor that prevented the ‘close the pits’ policy was from local governments and 
populations who tried to block the central government’s policy.  Localities stood to lose, 
or so they thought, substantially from any change in ownership of coalmines because they 
would lose direct ownership of the mines. 
 Behind the sudden spike in the demand for energy was China’s industrial boom.  
Just after the turn of the century, China’s economy underwent a sudden, unplanned 
change.  Heavy industrial production in the country nearly tripled since the late 1999, and 
the growth of energy demand spiked to nearly 13% a year.  So, the dramatic and sudden 
change in China’s economy from labor-intensiveness to energy-intensiveness caused a 
massive uptick in the demand for energy.  Equally as important are China’s sources of 
energy.  As has been previously mentioned, coal makes up nearly three-quarters of 
China’s energy consumption. In addition to rising demand for energy from industrial 
producers, the demand for energy to produce electricity, which has grown at a steadily 
high rate as China has developed, has stayed relatively high.  Just as was the case for 
industrial energy sources, China has leaned on coal to produce electricity.  Additionally, 
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households have increasingly increased coal consumption for heating their houses, 
heating their water, and cooking. 
 This sudden and unplanned increase in the demand for coal put serious pressure 
on the coal industry to meet output demands so the economy could keep growing.  
Reforming an industry like coal would take a massive amount of investment and time.  
Mines would need to be overhauled to meet safety standards.  SOE coal producers have a 
more thorough refining process, meaning it takes longer for coal to go from mine to 
market.  The pressure to meet demands for output seriously strained the central 
government’s ability to enact major reforms; chief among them the changing of mine 
control from TVEs to SOEs.28  If these factors weren’t formidable enough, localities 
presented an equally as severe roadblock to reform. 
 Tim Wright, a political economist and expert on China, describes local constraints 
on policy implementation as ‘recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances. 29   Wright 
explains this difficulty succinctly: 
In this situation the central state found it difficult to control local actors.  The greater the 
level of dependence of a particular area or group on the TVE mines, the greater the likely 
resistance to closing the pits.  The greater the level of dependence of a particular area or 
group on the TVE mines, the greater the likely resistance to closing the pits.  Larger 
economic or administrative units tended to be economically more diversified, so 
dependence was greatest lower down the administrative ladder, where coal made the 
greatest contribution to local income and employment… Despite widespread support for 
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the policy at higher levels, local governments and populations in such areas had perverse 
incentives to block its implementation. 
TVE coalmines were often started in poor areas, so they had an enormous effect in 
substantially raising local populations incomes.  So, for these groups, the maintenance of 
control of these coalmines was quite literally a matter of their livelihood.  It would seem 
self-evident that they would then put up substantial resistance to any reform policy that 
would take control of the coalmines out of their hands.  It was not just coalminers who 
stood in opposition to policy reforms, though.  Coal transportation was responsible for 
employment of massive amounts of people, sometimes more so than the mine itself.  Coal 
remains a vital source of fuel for most of the homes in TVE coalmine areas.  Moreover, 
coalmining and TVE added major amounts of revenue to the pocketbooks of local 
governments.  All of these entrenched local interests presented the central government a 
unified roadblock to reform.   
 In principle, it would seem these local forces would be hesitant to express 
opposition to the authoritarian central government.  That was not the case, though.  
Protests in local publications were common, along with warnings from local governments 
to the central governments that any change in policy would contribute to substantial 
social instability.  Moreover, miners themselves would sometimes directly organize 
protests against policy reform.29 
 Local interests are only one of a few major power players in China that are 
impeding reform, though.  China’s bureaucracy, and the competition within its 
bureaucracy, has caused a major reliance on coal. 
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Chinese Bureaucratic Competition – A Dirty Race to the Top 
 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is one of the most competitive, meritocratic 
institutions in the world.  Elite college graduates vie for entry-level positions in the 
country’s bureaucracy, and hope that in their decades of public service they could work 
their way up to controlling a state-owned enterprise, a county government, or even 
become a major figure in the CCP’s central government apparatus.  The CCP 
bureaucracy draws some of the best candidates from around China – and there is no 
shortage of competition.  This impressive meritocratic system has a major downside, 
though.   
 The primary goal of the CCP in recent decades has been economic growth – 
Beijing has wanted China to sustain incredibly growth rates of nearly 10% for as long as 
possible. Chinese bureaucrats who can deliver on this goal are rewarded, and Chinese 
bureaucrats who cannot deliver are not considered for promotion, or are even sometimes 
demoted.   
 Imagine XY, a forty year old with one child living in Wuhan.  XY has done very 
well – XY attended an elite public university and worked tirelessly; received an entry-
level position with a major state-owned manufacturing company in Wuhan; and has 
worked up to the top of that company.  There is now an open position as the director of 
manufacturing in the province of Hubei, and XY hopes to get the job.  However, a 
competitor, AB, of the same position as XY in Tianjin, is producing 20 more units per day 
at the same cost.  How is AB doing this?  AB has a connection to a coal producer in 
Manchuria who has been selling him cheap, dirty coal.  AB has been able to produce 
more units than XY because his overhead energy costs are lower, giving him more 
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discretionary spending flexibility on raw goods.  XY has been purchasing oil from 
China’s state-owned oil company, China National Petroleum Company, and it has cost 
him more than it has cost AB to produce one unit.   
 Its 2003 and the CCP has been prioritizing economic growth over all else for 
about a decade now.  Pollution is bad, it is true, but poverty is worse, and the CCP wants 
to address the latter issue immediately.  XY knows that the primary focus of the hiring 
board is how much a candidate has been able to produce, and at what cost.  XY knows to 
make himself competitive; he must start using cheap, unprocessed coal immediately.   
 The competition between AB and XY is not isolated to the two of them.  There are 
hundreds of bureaucrats at all sorts of top company-level positions who hope to be the 
director of manufacturing in Hubei.  They all know that if one wants to reduce costs, one 
should look no further than coal from TVE mining – it is dirty; but it is cheap, and it is 
abundant.  And when promotions are based on growth, environmental considerations take 
a backseat. 
 Now picture this scenario beyond manufacturing – coalmine directors vying for 
top positions in the CCP want to generate as much revenue as possible.  Therefore, they 
process their coal less and less in order to reduce costs and to undercut the costs of their 
competitors.  This same mindset of growth above all pervades throughout the Chinese 
economy.  With business booming, and China as the envy of all developing countries, the 
CCP does not want the machine to slow down.  Herein lies the problem of bureaucratic 
competition – the CCP’s prioritization of growth above all destroyed any incentive that 
company directors might have to use cleaner alternatives to TVE coal.  The widespread 
use of coal has had disastrous consequences not just to China’s environment. 
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A Silver Lining in the Smog 
 The consequences of China’s coal burning are not invisible.  When people 
conceptualize the issue of CO2 emissions, they think of it as a problem in the future – an 
imminent rise in sea levels; potential disastrous effects on ecological life; a slow-but-sure 
destruction of coastal properties.  In reality, though, China’s emissions from coal burning 
are having a deadly effect today.  Air pollution in China is amongst the most deadly and 
most pressing public health issues in the world – and it is warranting serious attention 
from the CCP. 
 According to Berkeley Earth, a research group, air pollution is believed to kill 
more people worldwide than AIDS, malaria, breast cancer, or tuberculosis; causing 
between 3 and 7 million deaths per year by worsening cardiorespiratory disease.30  
Berkeley Earth estimates that 1.6 million deaths per year can be attributed to Chinese 
pollution killing Chinese citizens.  This is equivalent to 4 thousand deaths per day, or 
17% of all deaths in China.  Cardiorespiratory deaths account for roughly 55% of all 
Chinese deaths compared to 42% in the US, despite much higher obesity rates.  Air 
quality in Beijing is so poor, that spending a day outdoors in Beijing is as bad as smoking 
40 cigarettes.  While the researchers admit that making the link between pollution and 
mortality is difficult, and that their methods are potentially flawed in some ways, even 
with slight statistical corrections downwards in terms of mortality rates related to 
pollution, the numbers are still highly disturbing.  Moreover, weather patterns in China 
make this a national issue.  Although most emissions are from coal burning plants in 
coastal cities, wind moves air pollution throughout the Pacific coast, and towards 
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northern parts of the country.  No one is able to escape the detrimental effects of the 
smog – even if someone were to decide to forgo economic opportunity in large coastal 
cities for a healthier rural lifestyle, they would still be exposed to harmful air pollution no 
matter where they go, albeit at a lesser level. 
 According to The Economist, air pollution has become an unmitigated nightmare 
for the Chinese government.31  It is a national public health crisis that is straining the 
medical system, reducing workplace efficiency, and decimating the tourism industry.  
This has been, and is increasingly becoming, a serious strain on the legitimacy of the 
CCP.  The CCP has long staked its legitimacy on improving standards of living for its 
people.  It has done so in the recent past by shepherding the Chinese economy into one of 
the most impressive periods of sustained economic growth in the world’s history.  To do 
so, it has thrown whatever it can get its hands on into the fire pit, powering its massive 
economic surge mostly on dirty, cheap, and abundantly available coal.  The national 
health crisis that is air pollution is now changing their calculus.  The costs of limitless 
burning of coal are rising rapidly, while the benefits are slowly beginning to slow down.   
Chinese municipalities have begun keeping statistics on pollution levels for the first time.  
Even Chinese state media is beginning to decry the issue as a serious national crisis.  The 
Chinese government has addressed the issue, but how will it go about solving it? 
 This issue ties into climate change because the source of the problem is consistent 
between the two issues.  Air pollution and exorbitant CO2 emissions both stem from 
uncontrolled burning of fossil fuels (mostly dirty coal from TVE mines).  While the 
Chinese government is beginning to recognize climate change as an important 
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international issue, it sees air pollution as a serious threat to its national legitimacy.  This 
may be enough to force the CCP to act in a rapid and effective manner, to drop the 
hammer on the coal industry, and to reform its energy industry.  Somewhere in all of the 
smog over Beijing, there is a silver lining. 
 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Prices 
 Amid the growing angst over coal burning, a major development has occurred in 
energy markets – the sustained plummet of oil and natural gas prices across the globe.  
The drop in the prices of oil and natural gas prices are in part driven by excess supply, 
which may very well be fixed in the near future.  Another factor contributing to the drop 
in prices, though, seems to be more of a permanent change than excess supply – the 
slowing of economies in emerging countries, especially China.  Much of this has to do 
witch China reconfiguring its economy from an industrial production focus to a services 
focus.  China will not need as much energy in the future, and the decline in demand from 
China has caused oil prices to plummet.  Oil prices are at an 11-year low, according to 
the Wall Street Journal.  The Brent Crude Index, a measure of oil prices, has dropped to 
$34.06 per barrel, the lowest level since 2004 – in 2011, the Brent Crude price averaged 
well over $100 per barrel.  Gasoline prices have plummeted as well, as gasoline futures 
are trading at their lowest level since 2009.32 
Despite the assumption that oil prices will rise in the short to mid term, the fall of 
prices for oil and natural gas provide China a window of opportunity to reduce reliance 
on coal.  Low oil prices are making crude a much more competitive alternative to coal.  
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Additionally, a switch from coal to oil will help ease the burden of air pollution in major 
cities – a hugely important domestic issue for the CCP. 
 
How to Kill Two Birds with One Stone 
 Two great pressures are pressing down on the Chinese government.  The first 
comes from within its own border, as air pollution is at its worst levels in the country’s 
history.  Air pollution is linked to more and more deaths every year, and the issue is 
challenging the legitimacy of the government.  The second pressure comes internationally 
as the globe tries to cut CO2 emissions to reduce the worst future effects of climate 
change.  China, being the world’s largest emitter, is under immense strain to combat this 
issue so it can be respected internationally as a responsible country. 
 To remedy these two issues, China needs to do one thing – reduce its reliance on 
coal.  A convenient parallel of means to battle against two separate issues provides China 
ample impetus for action.  Not only will reducing coal please climate diplomats from 
across the world, it will also cut down on poisonous smog hovering over Chinese cities. 
 Intentions and actions are two very different things, however.  The CCP has a lot 
of work to do – combating domestic interest groups, overturning entrenched industrial 
methods, and raising awareness in households.  This was the context when Chinese 
diplomats sat down with their American counterparts in 2014 to hammer out details of a 
bilateral agreement to reduce CO2 emissions.  What emerged from those negotiations is 
an ambitious and optimistic roadmap as to how China can reduce CO2 emissions.   
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Conclusion 
 China finds itself in a sticky predicament.  Its high emissions are ravaging the 
countries ecological systems through climate change; and are responsible for deadly 
health problems for millions of its citizens.  However, initial attempts to rein in 
emissions, or at least make its energy burning more efficient, have ended in bluster.  As 
the twin problems of climate change and air pollution intensify in China, the CCP will 
increasingly be faced with the necessity to reform its energy sector.  Doing so may 
require a different approach than just closing the pits. 
 China’s challenges complicate the global fight against climate change.  The CCP 
is hesitant to take any action that might impede economic growth.  Yet, comprehensive 
global action necessitates decisive and cooperative reform in China.  The asymmetry of 
Chinese and global interests has major implications for any multilateral effort to combat 
climate change. 
 Specifically, China’s reliance on CO2 emissions for economic growth makes 
climate change negotiations with them much more difficult.  This would not detract US, 
itself a high emitter of CO2 and the presumed leader of the liberal institutional 
international community, from pursuing negotiations with the Chinese.  Chinese 
stubbornness can only go so far, though – in the face of international pressure, and more 
importantly a crisis of air pollution, China seemingly would have to act sooner or later.  
The question, then, is how cooperative and committed the Chinese would be to 
multilateral negotiation efforts to combat climate change.  Would the Chinese turn their 
back on international negotiations and chart their own course?  Or would they be an 
active participant in a newly forming international regime to combat climate change? 
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Chapter III: The United States and Climate Change 
 When it comes to climate change, the United States is full of contradictions.  US 
is the country in the world most able to affect action on the issue, yet for much of recent 
history it has been amongst the most hesitant countries to do so.  Its geography is full of 
impressively wide ecological systems, but its population is most dense in its pockets of 
industrial havens and urban centers. It has a long history of conservationism, yet this 
component of environmental ideology always seems to be at odds, if not actively 
competing, with an impulse for economic growth harnessed by consuming its own 
natural resources.  The constant tug-of-war of the American political system has sucked 
into its partisan vacuum the climate change issue, and this has major implications for the 
world. 
 This chapter sets out to paint a picture of a US political system that has through its 
history - and continues to this day – have a persistent debate about the balance of 
environmentalism and economic growth.  Is there, a historical precedent of 
environmentalism in US political thought?  How do existing institutions and ideologies in 
US stack up to the challenge of climate change, and what must be changed to compensate 
for their inadequacies?  US is paying the price (and will continue to) for its history of cap 
less CO2 emissions.  Why are US emissions so high?  How has the political system 
responded to this issue? 
 
Effects, and Potential Effects of Climate Change on the U.S.  
Climate change has had serious and overwhelmingly negative effects on the 
United States.  Moreover, negative trends caused by climate change on the United States 
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are projected to continue, and in most cases get worse, in the future.  The most negative 
aspects of climate change will disproportionately affect coastal ecosystems and societies.  
However, negative consequences of climate change will be felt throughout the United 
States.  
The most vulnerable region of the United States to the effects of climate change is 
Alaska.  According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, Arctic summer sea ice 
is receding faster than previously projected and is expected to disappear before 2050.33 
This trend has caused multiple vulnerabilities, such as drier landscapes, more wildfires, 
altered wildlife habitat, increased cost of maintaining infrastructure, and has released 
greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change.  Additionally, Alaska’s marine 
fishery productivity is down – Alaska’s fisheries have the highest commercial value 
amongst any state in the U.S.  The state government of Alaska concurs, claiming that the 
existence of 160 communities along Alaska’s coast is under serious threat due to sea ice 
retreat, permafrost melt, and coastal erosion.34 The southwestern U.S. is also very 
susceptible to the negative consequences of climate change.  According to the U.S. 
Global Change Research Program, the southwestern US produces more than half of the 
nation’s high-value crops, but increased warming, drought, insect outbreaks, and 
wildfires caused by or linked to climate change will threaten crop production indefinitely.  
Moreover, coastal cities in California, home to more than 90% of the region’s population, 
are under threat of flooding, especially caused by extreme high tides.  The 2014 National 
Climate Assessment claims that, “Climate change poses a major challenge to U.S. 
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agriculture because of the critical dependence of the agricultural system on climate and 
because of the complex role agriculture plays in rural and national social and economic 
systems…  It will also alter the stability of food supplies and create new food security 
challenges for the United States as the world seeks to feed nine billion people by 2050.”35 
Major cities and ecosystems on the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Coast will be 
seriously impacted by rising sea levels.  According to PBS, damaging floods caused by 
global warming-induced storm surges could batter 3.7 million U.S. residents in 2,150 
coastal areas.36  Florida, New York, and New Jersey are amongst the states most 
vulnerable to hurricanes and flooding, and also are the most densely populated.  There are 
numerous cities built on the coast – Houston, New Orleans, Miami, and New York City, 
Los Angeles, Boston, and Seattle, to name a few – and these major metropolitan areas are 
directly under threat of both major storm systems that batter the coast; and to the 
consistent rise in sea level. 
While coastal areas have and are expected to continue to bare the brunt of the 
effects of climate change, the Midwest US is not immune to issues.  Drought and food 
shortages especially will affect the many already dry areas of the country.  Major urban 
areas like Chicago, Detroit, and Dallas rely on food imports from southwest farms. 
 There is a more compelling and optimistic narrative of what preventative actions 
would accomplish.  According to an Environmental Protection Agency report, taking 
measures to reduce CO2 emissions and investing in geo-engineering technology will save 
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millions of dollars, hundreds of ecosystems, and thousands of lives in the U.S. by 2050.37 
The EPA report estimates that at least 14,000 lives will be saved by 2050 because of 
improvements in air quality and reductions in extreme weather events.  Additionally, the 
report estimates that by 2050 the American taxpayer will have saved $43.57 billion 
because of reductions in infrastructural damage, labor costs, and ecological damage 
(including agriculture).  According to a report by Tim McDonnell, a senior writer for 
Mother Jones, existing global policies to limit warming could benefit the economy by up 
to $2 trillion by 2030.38 The juxtaposition of these statistics is staggering - on the one side 
is inaction coupled with complete disaster; on the other is mega-savings coupled with 
thorough reform.  While it is possible that these projections will end up being 
overestimates, it is worth noting them because they help frame the conversation as ‘what 
can happen, and what can we do,’ rather than ‘what is going to happen and why we are 
helpless.’   
 The human-caused climate change hypotheses discussed and embraced in Chapter 
One would certainly implicate US as a main culprit in climate change.  In this way, US 
have helped sew its own fate with regards to the detrimental effects of climate change.  
But it did so unintentionally, and in the process became the strongest economy in the 
world.  Additionally, there is a long strand of ideological conservationism that provides 
hope for US going forward.  What differentiates the debate in US with China, though, is 
that in the US the debate between conservationism and ‘extractionism’ (the idea that 
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humans should use Earth’s resources for their development) has a particular moral and 
theoretical element to it.   
 
Philosophy of Human and Nature 
 Industrialization began broadly throughout much of the world in the mid-to-late 
1800s.  In US, this development had a particularly manufacturing-based character, 
highlighted no better than by the development of the so-called ‘Rust Belt,’ a string of 
northeastern cities based on trade and manufacturing; and by the expansion of US 
economy westward.  As has been discussed in Chapter One, the effects of the Industrial 
Revolution on the climate, particularly in causing a spike of CO2 emissions, are just now 
becoming better known.  But the debate over the relationship between industrialization 
and nature had always existed, and is pertinent to modern the modern climate change 
debate. 
 The late Carlo M. Cipolla, a world-renowned economic historian, argued in his 
landmark book Before the Industrial Revolution that for all of human history humans had 
been subservient to nature, and that in fact much of human existence had been an effort to 
survive nature.  Cipolla argues that the Industrial Revolution changed this dynamic, 
making humans the masters of nature.39  In Cipolla’s view, humans began to use nature to 
power its own development.  For example, Americans began major deforestation 
programs in the Northeast to gather the wood to be burnt to power industrial plants.  
Cipolla’s thesis is largely based on a win-lose analysis of the relationship between 
humans and nature.  The implication of this take for contemporary issues is that if 
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humans are to fight climate change, they would need to reverse the relationship between 
humans and nature once again, or at least ‘cede’ ground to nature. 
While Cipolla’s view highlights the negative effects of industrialization on nature, 
it is not nuanced enough to encapsulate the various elements of the relationship between 
humans and nature.  Sara Pritchard, an environmental politics academic at Cornell 
University, and Thomas Zeller, a professor of history at the University of Maryland, offer 
a better take than Cipolla.  Pritchard and Zeller argue that a different framework should 
be used in analyzing industrialization, and that the debate about industrialization should 
view industrialization as a natural process. Pritchard and Zeller claim is that there is no 
dichotomy between nature and humans, and that indeed humans are a part of nature – 
therefore their actions are ‘natural.’40  While humans clearly are able to cause damage to 
the environment, humans are themselves a part of nature.  In a way, humans burning 
fossil fuels for development is no different than a giraffe eating the leaves of a tree, albeit 
on a much larger scale. 
The implication of this argument is that human action towards nature is indeed 
action towards itself.  Conceptually this argument may be confusing, but when taken 
practically it is obvious – humans are suffering as a result of climate change.  There is a 
link between human action and human suffering with regards to climate change.  If 
Cipolla’s view were correct, humans would not suffer from environmental degradation 
because he uses a win-lose framework.   
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This is all very abstract, though – practically speaking, what is the significance of 
these theories?  Throughout the history of US, Pritchard and Zeller’s theory of the 
relationship between nature and industrialization is .  From the first industrial revolution 
through contemporary times, there has been a constant give and take between 
conservationism and extractionism, reflecting the intricate interplay between humans and 
their natural habitat, especially given humans uniquely positioned to affect nature. 
 
Theory in Practice: Teddy the Frontiersman 
Probably no other politician in US history appreciated the link between human 
and nature than Theodore Roosevelt – or at least no other politician was in a significant 
enough position to turn this appreciation into major action.  President Roosevelt took 
office in 1901, decades after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in US.  While 
President Roosevelt could not have been entirely aware of the effects of industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions on the environment, as the science at this stage was 
underdeveloped, he was acutely concerned with deforestation in US as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution. 
 Laura Lovett, a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, argues 
that Roosevelt invariably considered conservation as an integral component of making a 
better future for the ‘American race.’  Lovett argues that for Roosevelt, ‘the management 
of natural resources’ was fused with ‘the management of the race.’41 For Roosevelt, 
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humans were only as prosperous as their environment, because Roosevelt believed that 
humans were a part of nature. 
 To be sure, up until the Roosevelt Administration, deforestation was a major issue 
facing US.  According to Douglas W. MacCleery, a historian with the Forest History 
Society, industrialization and population growth had significantly contributed to 
deforestation in US.  MacCleery claims that in many areas in US, particularly the in 
Northeastern states and Midwestern frontier states such as Indiana and Illinois, forest 
cover had fallen from about 70% to 20% in just five decades.42  Andrea Becker, a 
biologist and reporter on environmental issues, claims that prior to European settlement, 
US had about 46% forest cover – by 1907, the percentage of US covered by forest had 
been reduced to 33%.43   
 Roosevelt was at his core an ardent conservationist, and believed that 
environment, society, and individual were all linked.  For Roosevelt, the frontiersman 
spirit was imbued in the ‘American race,’ and this impulse for outdoorsman ship need be 
cultivated as a matter of social necessity.  Lovett paints such a picture of Roosevelt (112): 
Roosevelt was deeply dedicated to the Lamarckian idea that the environment could 
profoundly influence an organism and that the results of that environmental influence 
could be passed from generation to generation.  The highly valued character of the 
frontiersman was as much a result of blood as breeding, that is, living in the frontier 
environment.  The ability of the environment to shape the character of an individual, 
family or race was crucially important to Roosevelt because it allowed that altering the 
environment was a powerful and lasting means of social reform. 
 
President Roosevelt thus saw the national character of America as linked to the strength 
of its ecology.  His view that environmental protection was linked to American 
                                                
42 MacCleery, Douglas W.  “American Forests: A History of Resiliency and Recovery.”  
Durham: Forest Hill Society (2011). 
43 Becker, Andrea.  “Rates of Deforestation and Reforestation in the U.S.”  Demand 
Media.  Web. 
 61 
nationalism is based on the theory of humans as a part of nature.  Putting aside 
Roosevelt’s antiquated ideas of the ‘American race’ and 20th century nationalism, what 
was clear for Roosevelt was that America could only be as strong as its environment.  
Thus, deforestation would seem an incredible issue for him. 
 In 1905, President Roosevelt established the Bureau of Forestry.  This would be 
the executive arm in reforesting US.  Through the Bureau of Forestry, Roosevelt 
aggressively acted to reforest US.  According to the US National Park Serivce, Roosevelt 
established 230 million acres of national parks, 150 million acres of which were national 
forests.  Moreover, Roosevelt established 51 Federal Bird Reserves, and created 23 total 
National Park sites.44   
 President Roosevelt was significant because he established a link in the American 
political psyche between prosperity and environment.  Roosevelt created the precedent of 
seeing environmental protection as a component of maintaining national strength.  This 
ideology fits Pricthard and Zeller’s theory of humans as a part of nature.  Additionally, 
Roosevelt’s reforestation efforts helped salvage US’ natural sinks that now are 
responsible for significant reduction of CO2 emissions – an unforeseen but important 
consequence of his policies.  However, industrialization did not stop at the turn of the 20th 
century.  Indeed, it expanded and evolved.  Thus, the debate between conservationism 
and extractionism would continue, and as such the ‘Roosevelt School’ of conservationism 
would need to adapt to changing environmental conditions.  The ‘Roosevelt school’ of 
conservationism is largely based on abstract ideas, metaphysical principles, and romantic 
ideas of American national character.  Soon, this theoretical framework would evolve. 
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The Second Wave of Industrialization and Nixon’s Energy Policy 
 After World War II, geopolitical and domestic dynamics were changing rapidly 
for US.  The geographic isolation of US shielded it from much of the negative 
consequences of WWII, and New Deal economic reforms began to improve US’ 
economic outlook.  A bipolar world, in which US and the Soviet Union (USSR) were 
preeminent and adversarial, was quickly emerging.   
 Additionally, the economy of US was rapidly changing, and for that matter 
rapidly growing.  According to US Bureau of Economic Analysis, between 1936 and 
1950, the annualized GDP growth rate dipped below 20% only four times, exceeded 50% 
five times, including two years in which it exceeded 100%.45  The growth of US 
economy at this time raised median incomes substantially, and a bourgeoning middle 
class created a huge consumer-market.  When one thinks of the post-WWII period, they 
conjure images of the rise of the nuclear family, suburbia America, and home ownership.  
With this development came a major spike in energy consumption that built upon the 
sustained uptick in energy consumption stemming from the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution.  The graph on the next page is based on figures provided by the Energy 
Information Administration, and was compiled by the physics department at the 
University of Western Oregon.46  It shows energy consumption by source between 1650 
and 2000: 
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These statistics are significant.  In the post-WWII period, energy consumption 
skyrocketed.  Behind this was an expansion of US manufacturing industry, the 
widespread use of automobiles, and the growth of home ownership. 
 At the time, not unlike the reforestation period of the T. Roosevelt 
Administration, the issue of CO2 emissions and climate change was relatively unknown 
and obscure.  But other environmental and energy issues emerged.  Enter the 
Administration of Richard Nixon in 1969, and with it the new school of ‘technocratic 
environmentalism.’  The context of this new school was a particular geopolitical 
character of American energy policy caused by the role of US in the Cold War.   
 Rogers C.B. Morton, a former Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of 
Commerce for the Ford and Nixon Administrations, describes the Nixon 
Administration’s energy policy as a reaction to the challenge of changing global energy 
politics.  Morton wrote in 1973 about Nixon’s energy policy:47  
A serious energy situation awaited the incoming Nixon administration in 1968.  It 
stemmed from the fact that the nation was… in a period of transition from a long era of 
cheap and abundant indigenous energy and neglect of environmental consequences to one 
of scarcity of acceptable clean fuels, growing dependence on foreign energy imports, 
inadequate development of alternate clean energy sources and a growing interest in 
maintaining, or enhancing environmental values.  Reacting to the challenge, the Nixon 
administration adopted an energy policy designed to ensure an adequate and dependable 
supply of energy to meet the country’s essential requirements and to assure its prosperity 
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and security in ways which are consistent with the nation’s environmental and social 
goals. 
 
Essentially, Morton argued that President Nixon’s energy policy aimed to achieve two 
goals.  The first was improving US energy security - ensuring the supply of energy would 
not be impeded by various factors.  This would ensure US economic prosperity, 
particularly vis-à-vis USSR.  The second goal was to minimize adverse environmental 
effects of energy consumption. 
 To achieve energy security, according to Sec. Morton, Nixon followed a two-
pronged strategy of developing a stable domestic energy sector, and of creating a 
geopolitical landscape that ensured strong relationships with energy exporters across the 
globe.  On the domestic side, President Nixon, working with Congress and through 
executive branch agencies, dramatically expanded the scope of domestic energy 
production.  This included promoting US domestic oil production through offshore 
drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and in Alaska, improving oil and natural gas pipeline 
infrastructure, and funding research and development in alternative energy sources such 
as hydropower, says Morton.  Internationally, President Nixon moved to strengthen 
relations with major oil exporters, chief among them Saudi Arabia.  According to Richard 
Mills, an energy sector analyst, President Nixon and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia agreed 
that all Saudi oil could only be purchased in US dollars, establishing the US dollar as the 
‘petrodollar.’48  President Nixon was concerned about the value of the dollar after the 
elimination of the gold standard, and ensuring that Saudi oil could only be purchased in 
US dollars made global demand for US dollars seemingly permanent.  King Faisal 
wanted to strengthen Saudi oil exports to US, at the time the largest economy in the 
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world.  By striking the agreement, a strong oil trade relationship between the two 
countries was established. 
 While President Nixon secured American energy sources, he also moved 
aggressively on the environmental front to ensure US energy consumption was 
sustainable.  According to Sarah A. Vogel, a vice president of the Environmental Defense 
Fund, President Nixon faced a ‘toxicity crisis.’  Air and water pollution stemming from 
energy consumption, according to Vogel, began to take center stage as a public health 
crisis, mostly propelled by the release of multiple sets of landmark research linking 
chemical air pollution and cancer. Nixon’s first action to address this issue was to direct 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to try to define and regulate these chemicals.  It 
quickly became apparent that the FDA had inadequate regulatory authority to fulfill 
either of these tasks, particularly the latter.49 
 President Nixon decided a more comprehensive regulatory agency was needed to 
specifically address air and water pollution.  President Nixon, therefore, established the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be the new frontlines organization to protect 
the environment.  According to John R. Quarles, Jr., former Deputy Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, President Nixon saw EPA as an organization with 
specified legislative authority to create and enforce legal requirements related to 
pollution.  In the past, various federal agencies served supervisory roles in researching 
pollution and its sources, but could only serve an advocacy role because of the lack of 
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clear legal regulatory authority.  EPA would be responsible for the entirety of the process 
of environmental regulation, from research to law.50 
 This marked a dramatic evolution of the Roosevelt tradition.  Roosevelt’s 
environmental strategy was centered on maintaining natural environmental strength as a 
matter of national character.  For Roosevelt, the importance of nature as a part of the 
American national identity meant that a central objective of environmental reform was 
the maintenance of wilderness.  The emergence of pollution as a serious threat to 
American public health moved environmentalism from a metaphysical and nationalistic 
concept to a practical technocratic necessity.  Additionally, the geopolitical aspects of 
energy policy created a new emphasis on security and sustainability.  President Nixon, in 
establishing secure energy networks for US while simultaneously developing a coherent 
regulatory regime addressed the changing dynamics of the situation – indeed, the 
‘technocratic school’ of environmentalism was a fusion of energy policy and 
environmental policy not seen before in US politics.  The most significant outcome of the 
reign of ‘technocratic school’ environmentalism was the establishment of EPA, an 
agency whose importance only would increase over time, as will soon be shown. 
 ‘Technocratic school’ environmentalism was not a departure from ‘Roosevelt 
school’ conservationism, though.  Instead, it marked an evolution of Roosevelt’s view of 
humans as a species inextricably linked to nature.  President Nixon’s strategy involved 
adapting environmentalism to a changing geopolitical system, especially given US’ rising 
preeminence as a global power.  Again, Nixon moved from conservationism as a matter 
of nationalist character to environmentalism as a matter of technical necessity.  If humans 
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and nature were to survive in a changing and challenging world, government would have 
to take a central role in responsibly using its environment for the betterment of the 
country.  Regulation, as opposed to reforestation, became the new medium for action 
given the new circumstances. 
 Much alike how the ‘technocratic school’ was born out of an adaptation to 
circumstances not addressed by ‘Roosevelt school’ conservationism, new developments 
in environmental science would quickly change the set of challenges facing the Nixon 
environmental regime.  Soon, climate change would increasingly become a potent 
political issue in US.  Scientific research would soon change the concept of air pollution, 
and the circumstances of the climate change issue would critically deteriorate efficacy of 
unilateral environmentalism. 
 
Climate Change: A Global Threat, a US Failure 
 Climate change, for our purposes, became a major political issue during the 
Clinton Administration.  President Clinton was the first US President to seriously address 
climate change as a political issue.  Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
both invested time on environmental issues, but did not stray from the ‘technocratic 
school’ framework of environmentalism as a domestic pollution issue.  Despite efforts by 
both President Clinton and President Bush to address climate change in their own way, 
neither was able to successfully create a new environmental regime to address the 
changing dimensions of environmental issues.   
 According to reporting by Tori DeAngelis, a freelance journalist, President 
Clinton first tried to address climate change in 1993.  DeAngelis reports that on October 
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19, 1993, President Clinton released a 49-page plan designed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to their 1990 levels by 2000.  The plan, though, called for action through 
volunteerism by industry, accompanied by $1.9 billion in federal spending to address the 
environmental effects of reform.51  In addition to President Clinton’s domestic plan, he 
actively participated in international climate negotiations under the auspices of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  International negotiations under the 
Clinton Administration culminated in the signing of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the first 
effort at establishing a comprehensive global plan for action in combating climate 
change.   
 Both initiatives by the Clinton Administration wound up failing.  The hope for 
volunteerism amongst industry to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions amounted to 
failure (although greater publicity of the issue certainly improved awareness).  
Partisanship prevented any hope for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in US, so the 
Clinton Administration did not even attempt to send it to Congress.52  President Clinton’s 
failures were the result of a few factors, to be discussed shortly.   
Firstly, though the emergence of international negotiations was a new and 
significant development that must be discussed.  When President Roosevelt decided to 
pursue a reforestation agenda, he did not consult the United Kingdom or France.  When 
President Nixon set out to establish EPA, he did not call for UN negotiations.  This is a 
reflection of a critical new challenge for environmentalism in the climate change era.  
During the Nixon Administration, the primary environmental challenge centered around 
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air and water pollution by toxic and often carcinogenic chemicals.  Chemical pollution, 
then, was a local issue, and the technocratic school of environmentalism claimed the 
answer was the establishment of a local regulatory regime to combat hazardous air 
pollution.  During the Clinton Administration, more compelling scientific evidence was 
being presented that air pollution, namely greenhouse gases (chief among them CO2) was 
causing climate change, a global issue.  Therefore, the emergence of climate change as a 
political issue globalized US environmentalism.  Any evolution of the technocratic school 
of environmentalism would necessarily need to be enough of an adaptation to create a 
globalized solution.   
President Clinton’s failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol as US law was chiefly a 
result of a hyper-partisan climate and a scandal-plagued administration.  This excuse, 
though, does not belittle the fact that the Nixon environmental regime was inadequate to 
address climate change as a global issue.  Moreover, President Clinton was unable to, 
unlike Presidents Roosevelt and Nixon, to create and evolve existing theories of 
environmentalism to the pertinent times.  Indeed, in participating in Kyoto negotiations 
President Clinton tried to do just that, but he tried and failed. 
President George W. Bush, for his part, took a step in the wrong direction from 
President Clinton’s approach in that his administration refused to meaningfully 
participate in international climate negotiations.  Frank Gaffney, Jr., writing for National 
Review Online in 2001, summarized the President’s objections to international climate 
change negotiations as a refusal to cede sovereignty to any emerging international climate 
regimes. According to Gaffney, this was part of a broader rejection of multilateralism by 
the Bush Administration – a strategy that included his intention to “move beyond” the 
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1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with or without Russian assent; a refusal to ratify the 
Treaty of Rome establishing an International Criminal Court; and refusal to agree to the 
Biological Weapons Convention; among other things. 53   President Bush’s outright 
rejection of multilateralism obviously would mean that no new comprehensive global 
approach to climate change would be completed.  Thus, President Bush failed at 
following the proud tradition of two Republican presidents in comprising a strategy to 
promote the prosperity of humans and their habitat. 
Then-Senator Barack Obama ran a presidential campaign in 2008 expressly and 
explicitly calling for climate change action through domestic reform, and as importantly 
through multilateral diplomacy.  His election victory provided a new glimmer of hope 
that a president would finally adapt the environmentalist ideology to the pressing 
concerns of the time.  But time did not stand still during the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations, and inaction during those 16 years made the challenge the incoming 
Obama Administration faced all the more challenging.  First of all, climate change’s 
ascendance as a political issue, and the apparent requirement of emissions reductions, 
rallied interest groups to fight reform.  Secondly, as US twiddled its thumbs, the problem 
was getting much, much worse. 
 
The Emergence of the Fossil Fuel Industry as a Political Force 
 The fossil fuels industry is comprised of major oil, natural gas, and coal 
producers.  The development of US economy, and with it an ever growing demand for 
energy, necessitated the development of major domestic energy producers, as has already 
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been discussed.  A strongly developed fossil fuel industry has positively affected the US 
economy in many respects, such as by reducing energy prices, creating jobs, and 
enhancing energy security.  With that being said, an unforeseen consequence of a strong 
fossil fuel industry has been the aggregation of their interests as a lobbying force.  This 
has become all the more pertinent (and in fact could have been in part caused by) the 
emergence of climate change as a serious political issue.  To combat climate change 
would require a reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases, and given the current 
underdeveloped state of geo-engineering, therefore would require reducing national 
energy consumption.   This would have adverse effects on the fossil fuels industry as a 
whole.  As such, their lobbying efforts have a common goal – the preservation of fossil 
fuel consumption.  In effect the entrance of climate change into national political 
discussion served as a rallying cry for the fossil fuel industry to begin substantial 
lobbying efforts.   
 According to Oil Change International, a political research group, the fossil fuel 
industry spent a grand total of $326.2 million during the 113th congress (2013-14) in 
campaign contributions.54 Open Secrets, a research group that focuses on political 
contributions, claim that oil and gas (not coal) interest group contributions neared $288 
million in 2013-14.55  Moreover, according to Open Secrets, campaign contributions from 
the fossil fuel industry have dramatically increased in recent years as the climate change 
debate has intensified nationally – the past eight years have seen the highest levels of 
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campaign contributions from the fossil fuel industry in over three decades. Additionally, 
Open Secrets highlights the partisan split in campaign contributions from the fossil fuel 
industry – the overwhelming majority of campaign contributions have gone to members 
of the Republican Party.  In 2012, total campaign contributions to Republicans were more 
than quadruple the amount of total campaign contributions to Democrats, Open Secrets’ 
research indicates.  This trend has not reversed.  In 2015 and 2016, the top five recipients 
of campaign contributions were Republicans – Sen. Ted Cruz, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, 
Gov. Jeb Bush, Rep. John Boehner, and Rep. Kevin McCarthy, according to Open 
Secrets. 
 While environmental lobbying groups have formed together to try to counter the 
influence of fossil fuel lobbying, their resources are far less substantial than these 
entrenched industries.  According to Open Secrets, 2009 was the peak year of campaign 
contributions by environmental groups, with the total reaching just north of $24 million.  
Since then, environmental groups have contributed a total of about $100 million, on 
average almost $17 million per year. 56  Just as most of the fossil fuel industry’s 
contributions go to members of the Republican Party, most of environmental groups’ 
contributions go to members of the Democratic Party.  The top five recipients of 
contributions from environmental groups are all Democrats – Sen. Brian Schatz, Sec. 
Hillary Clinton, Sen. Chuck Schumer, Sen. Michael F. Bennet, and Sen. Patty Murray.   
 Maybe the most significant issue caused by such exorbitant lobbying efforts has 
been that climate change has become an intensely partisan issue.  Such substantial 
campaign contributions almost guarantee that most candidates for Republican political 
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office (at least the most deep-pocketed) will be opposed to reform.  This has resulted in 
the muddying and rejection of scientific research in public debate, and will continue to 
have pervasive political effects going forward. 
 
US Emissions: An Immense Issue 
 Today, US emissions are the second highest in the world, trailing behind only 
China.  According to 2011 EPA Statistics, US are responsible for 16% of total global 
emissions.  China is responsible for 28% of total global emissions, the European Union 
(EU) for 10%, India and Russia for 6% each, and Japan for 4%.57  These statistics have 
probably been skewed in the nearly five years since this report was published, perhaps 
caused by a rise in China’s percent of total global emissions. 
 The U.S. economy runs predominantly on fossil fuels, with a small percentage of 
energy production coming from renewables and nuclear energy.  Together, fossil fuels 
account for nearly 65% of primary energy use in the U.S., with renewables and nuclear 
power (zero and low-carbon emitting energy sources) only accounting for about 17% of 
primary energy use.  On the next page is a pie chart based on 2011 statistics from the 
Energy Information Administration (E.I.A.):58 
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The enormous market share advantage of the fossil fuel industry is compounded by the 
importance of energy consumption for economic growth.  Undoubtedly, this strengthens 
the hand of fossil fuel industry lobbyists.   
The E.I.A. also compiled a chart showing to which industries these energy 
sources go.  The chart is on the next page – again, these statistics are based on a 2011 
E.I.A. study and the chart was produced by the E.I.A. and made available on its 
website:58  
 
Oil	37%	
Natural	Gas	26%	
Coal	20%	
Nuclear	8%	
Renewables	9%	
Primary	Energy	Use	By	Source,	
2011	
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 While it may initially look like the distribution above is fairly even, a few striking 
numbers pop out.  93% of energy for transportation comes from petroleum.  Moreover, 
almost 90% of energy used for industrial purposes comes from fossil fuels.  Electrical 
production uses up 92% of total coal supplies and 100% of total nuclear energy supplies.   
 Some time has passed since these EPA statistics were published. The 
Congressional Research Service produced a report in 2014 that comes to somewhat of a 
different conclusion.59 According to the report, about 40% of energy consumed in the 
U.S. is supplied by oil; between 30% and 40% of consumption in the U.S. is natural gas.  
Additionally, according to the report, 93% of electricity generation is powered by coal.  
Renewables account for very little of total energy consumption in the U.S., the report 
finds.  Seemingly, US has increased its use of oil and natural gas vis-à-vis coal, but still 
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relies on coal (even more so now than in 2011) on a major scale for electricity generation.  
The discrepancy between these figures is probably a function of the changing energy 
picture in US, especially considering the shale boom, and differences in accounting.  
What is clear, though, from both sets of statistics is that US remains completely reliant on 
fossil fuels to power its economy. 
 Especially striking is how poorly US does in its CO2 emissions relative to similar 
economies.  Take for example the European Union (EU).  According to 2013 statistics 
provided by Europa, a EU government statistics agency, EU emits substantially less CO2 
than US industry-by-industry; and emits less per capita than US.60 
 Clearly, the major issue for US going forward is whether or not it can wean itself 
off of fossil fuels.  Assumedly, such a goal would require a strategy of reducing across 
the board energy consumption and improving renewable energy infrastructure.  The 
challenge, given the entrenchment of US fossil fuels industry (both as a lobbying force 
and the predominant US domestic energy producer), is immense.  A breakdown of the 
percentages of primary energy source by industry in both EU and US is provided in the 
table below, based on figures provided by EPA58 and Europa.  With these percentages, 
the total kilotons of CO2 emissions per sector was estimated using 2013 total CO2 
emission by country statistics provided by Nick Evershed of The Guardian:61 
		
US	as	a	
percentage	 EU	as	a	percentage	
US	(kt	
CO2)	
EU	(kt	
CO2)	
Industrial	 27	 17	 1,440,180	 580,550	
Transportation	 28	 22	 1,493,520	 751,300	
Residential	 45	 61	 2,400,300	 2,083,150	
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‘Industrial’ includes the combustion of fuel for industrial use, whether it is agricultural or 
manufacturing.  ‘Transportation’ includes combustion of fuel to power automobiles, 
trucks, ships, trains, and airplanes.  ‘Residential’ includes the combustion of fuel for 
habitation, including home heating, cooking, and electricity generation.  EPA and Europa 
do not use the same categorical breakdown by sector, so statistics have had to be 
synthesized into these three catchall, if imperfect categories. Despite this, these statistics 
do paint a picture of a much less inefficient economy in terms of emissions.  According 
to World Bank statistics, in 2011 US CO2 emissions as a ratio of kilograms per dollar of 
GDP was 0.3 – in EU the figure is a little less than 0.2.62  Moreover, US do worse than 
EU on a per capita basis in terms of CO2 emissions.  According to 2011 World Bank 
statistics, EU emitted 7.1 metric tons of CO2 per capita, while US emitted 17 metric tons 
of CO2 per capita.63 
 US are lagging behind in a serious way.  They emit more CO2 than EU, a larger 
economy with a bigger population.  President Bush’s successor would have a difficult 
time in two respects – reducing domestic CO2 emissions substantially, while 
simultaneously attempting to organize an international climate change regime in the 
context of past failures by US presidents to do so. 
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Conclusion 
 US reliance on fossil fuels has created a huge policy dilemma for its political 
leaders.  There is an ideological, historical, and scientific impetus for action on climate 
change.  Yet, without the burning of fossil fuels, US economic growth would stunt 
dramatically.  Moreover, there is a different aspect to the climate change issue than other 
environmental issues for past US presidents.  Climate change is truly a global issue, and 
given US’ position in the world system, it must take on a leadership role to galvanize 
international action.  Truly, the global aspect of climate change has made this issue as 
much of a foreign policy challenge as a domestic environmentalism challenge. 
The big question posed to the incoming Obama Administration in 2009 was 
whether or not he would be able to successfully establish an international climate change 
regime effective enough to mitigate the worst effects of climate change.  President 
Obama’s environmental legacy would depend on whether or not he is able to accomplish 
these ends.  Would he be able to succeed where his two predecessors failed?  President 
Obama would need to establish a third-era school of environmentalism, a ‘globalized 
school’ of environmentalism. 
 The globalization of US environmental issues complicates the challenge for 
President Obama.  Persistent problems, both domestic and international, have plagued 
multilateral climate negotiations thus far.  The issue is as local as it is global – the effects 
of climate change have no boundaries.  Tricky diplomatic and domestic hurdles would 
have to be overcome by President Obama if he were to succeed.  Whereas Presidents 
Roosevelt and Nixon were able to address their environmental crises solely through 
domestic action, a globalized environmental challenge requires Presidential leadership on 
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the global stage.  US is in the unique position of being the predominant source of the 
issue and country most able to affect positive change in combating climate change.  It is 
the source of the issue because of its reliance on consumption, and emissions over 
history.  It is in the best position to affect positive change because of its leadership role in 
the international system. The challenge for Obama would be whether or not he could 
affect change both at home and abroad. 
 The most obvious first step for President Obama would be to start off where his 
predecessor left off.  President Bush, for his part, declined to take this approach, and as 
such international climate negotiations had not progressed since President Clinton’s 
inability to clear the Kyoto Protocol through Congress.  While climate change has moved 
on, international negotiations are stuck in the late 1990s.  That seems a tough place to 
start for the President. 
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Chapter IV: International Climate Negotiations 
 The international climate change regime was in disarray when President Obama 
took office.  Two decades of neglect by the US political system left the movement 
leaderless.  Moreover, Chinese hesitancy for reform had threatened to derail multilateral 
efforts before they started.  The old ghosts of past failures at multilateralism would haunt 
the Obama Administration’s first efforts in Copenhagen in 2009.  Whether or not he 
would be able to rectify these issues would be a telltale sign of whether or not 
establishing a comprehensive international climate change regime would be realistic. 
 
International Climate Diplomacy: A Sustainable Failure  
With global temperatures on the rise, and a growing, if not overwhelming, body 
of scientific evidence blaming man-made CO2 emissions, climate change is clearly a 
major issue for the international community.   The United States and China, the world’s 
two largest CO2 emitters, both realize this.  However, the global nature of climate change 
necessitates an international response.  This dynamic certainly complicates an already 
complicated issue. 
 Many states have long accepted the need for international diplomacy to combat 
climate change.  The final round of negotiations on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was completed in 1992.  This was supposed 
to be a watershed moment.  Unfortunately, the short history of the UNFCCC has been 
mired with failure.  It has yielded numerous summits in which the international 
community had been incapable of coming to a comprehensive international agreement to 
address the issue.  The two most notorious failures of UNFCCC summits were the 1997 
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Conference of Parties (COP) III in Kyoto, Japan, and the 2009 COP XV in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.   
 COP III, also known as the Kyoto Protocol, was successful in creating a 
framework agreement that CO2 emissions across the globe had to be reduced.  However, 
given the political climate in the US, at the time the largest emitter in the world, the 
agreement was not worth much.  According to Timothy Wirth, a former U.S. Senator, the 
Clinton Administration agreed to the framework in Kyoto, but quickly put it on the 
political backburner after congressional Republicans claimed that the Protocol was dead 
on arrival to the Senate.64 There is not much the Clinton Administration could do at that 
point, as Republicans were in control of both chambers of U.S. Congress.  Additionally, 
soon-to-come scandals certainly derailed any hope of bipartisanship.  The Kyoto Protocol 
led to another COP summit in Prague, Czech Republic, in 2000. Then presidential 
candidate George W. Bush made a mistake with major repercussions on the campaign 
trail, according Wirth.  While on the campaign trail, Bush decried the Protocol as a threat 
to American sovereignty.  While doing this, he also embraced emissions cuts, going as 
far as proposing to amend the Clean Air Act to require mandatory carbon emissions 
reductions from utilities companies.  After Bush took office, a series of missteps spelt 
disaster for international climate diplomacy.  The Administrator of the EPA Christine 
Todd Whitman publicly restated Bush’s campaign desire to cut CO2 emissions, putting 
the debate on the front burner of US politics, and galvanizing the natural gas industry to 
intensify lobbying efforts.  Meanwhile Condoleezza Rice, then the administration’s 
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national security advisor, told European ambassadors to consider Kyoto dead.65 This had 
the effect of signaling to the international community that the Bush Administration had 
no intention of dealing with climate change through the UNFCCC.  These public 
missteps, Wirth claims, doomed Kyoto, and along with it any international action on 
climate change for the remainder of the Bush Administration.   
 Without the Bush Administration’s missteps, it would still have been unlikely that 
the climate change reform would have gone anywhere, though.  President Clinton was 
unable overcome a Republican majority in Congress, and until the political landscape in 
the US shifted, it is unlikely any change would come about.  Additionally, there were 
many initial flaws with the Kyoto Protocol – indeed, it was only a framework agreement 
and had no plan for implementation.  The withdrawal of the world’s largest economy and 
largest polluter from the process put the damper on any hopes of reform.   
 Fast forward to the end of the Bush presidency.  The world at that point was a 
very, very different place.  The Bush Administration had just gone through two faulty 
foreign ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the global economy was crashing from the 
financial crisis. Senator Barack Obama was a surging figure in national politics.  His 
campaign message of change was vaulting him towards the White House, and one of his 
principle goals was to bring climate change back as a crucial political issue.  Obama won 
the presidential election in 2008, while carrying on his back enough Democratic 
congressional victories to earn a majority in both the House and the Senate.  He promised 
to improve relations with the international community on a variety of diplomatic issues.  
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And with his election victory came a new hope – the revitalization of progress at 
UNFCCC.   
Additionally, at this point the climate change landscape had also changed.  China 
had overtaken the U.S. as the biggest emitter of CO2 in the world in 2006.  The US would 
no longer be able to single-handedly affect climate change negotiations with its 
involvement (or lack thereof).   Any climate agreement necessitated the involvement of 
both China and the US.  This new development complicated international efforts to 
combat climate change at the very moment when it seemed as though the political winds 
in the US were beginning to shift. 
Despite this new wrinkle, the COP XV in December 2009 located in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, would be the Obama Administration’s first crack at addressing climate change; 
and would highlight the US’ renewed dedication to multilateral climate change 
diplomacy.  The Obama Administration was riding a wave of popularity both at home 
and abroad, and hoped to seize the moment to get real results in Copenhagen, therein 
notching a major success early on in the Administration.  However, much to the dismay 
of both the White House and the international community, COP XV was a resounding 
failure.  It failed to produce any comprehensive framework, and even failed to achieve 
the same level of international commitment as the Kyoto Protocol.   
Over the long course of negotiations during COP XV, no consensus text was even 
produced until the last minute.  The Copenhagen Accord, a two and a half page 
document, only enabled UNFCCC to continue climate negotiations with a COP XVI.  
According to Navroz Dubash, a senior fellow for the Centre for Policy Research, the 
main source of disagreement that derailed COP XV from the start was a critical 
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disagreement between industrialized and developing countries.66  This disagreement, 
according to Dubash, splintered the international community from the beginning.  
Industrialized countries wanted to approach the issue as a ‘techno-managerial’ process in 
which markets would be utilized to reduce emissions (for example through cap-and-trade, 
carbon tax, etc.…) and to develop new geo-engineering technologies.  Generally, the US 
and the EU led this bloc.  The developing countries saw the issue in a different light – 
they believed the industrialized countries to be responsible for the large majority of CO2 
pollution over the course of history, and felt it their right to emit equal amounts of CO2 
unless developed countries provided financial aid and technological assistance to 
alleviate the economic effects of CO2 emission reductions.  China, now the world’s 
largest emitter, and a country growing rapidly because of heavy industrial manufacturing, 
was the leader of this bloc, along with other BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa).  This difference doomed COP XV from the start, according to 
Dubash, because neither side was able to work out their differences with the other, nor by 
the time heads of states began to arrive in Copenhagen to enter the ‘final stage’ of 
negotiations, no substantive progress had been made on the issue. 
Martin Khor, executive director of South Centre, offers a partially different 
explanation for the failure at COP XV.  According to Khor, western leaders attempted to 
hijack legitimate multilateral negotiations by producing their own accord in private, 
followed by an attempt to ram it through COP, giving developing countries little time to 
review, debate and amend the document.  While the body of the UNFCCC worked on the 
Bali Action Plan, which were bottom-up negotiations focused on mitigation, adaptation, 
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finance, technology, and a shared vision, a secluded group of western negotiators worked 
separately on their own Copenhagen Accord.  Both ad-hoc and unofficial conferences 
collided on the 19th of December, according to Khor, and the wedge between the two 
bodies was too large to overcome in a short amount of time.  Moreover, the divisions 
sowed at COP XV would continue to poison climate diplomacy.67 
While both Dubash and Khor are quick to assume that the failure of COP XV was 
the result of differences between two blocs, developing and industrialized countries, there 
is another potential explanation that focuses on local politics in the two major CO2 
emitting countries – the US and China.  Paul G. Harris, a professor of Global and 
Environmental Studies at Hong Kong University, argues that the real flaw with COP XV 
was the ‘malignancy of the great polluters.’  Harris argues that neither the US nor China 
were seriously prepared to address their own exorbitant emissions in 2009, thereby 
dooming COP XV.  If the US and China were unwilling to reduce their CO2 emissions, 
and these two countries were primarily responsible for a large chunk of the annual 
emissions at the time, then why would other countries make any sacrifices?68 Harris’ 
critique may be a little too harsh for the US – indeed, with the election of Barack Obama 
in 2008; it looked like the US domestic audience was poised for some sort of climate 
action.  However, Harris is probably right about reluctance for action in Beijing, 
especially given the Communist Party’s (CCP) reliance on economic growth as a 
foundation of political legitimacy.  This is not to say, though, that there was not a 
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substantial portion of the US that was against climate change action in 2009, especially 
considering the size and influence of major fossil fuel lobbying groups throughout the 
US. 
It is unfair to blame a single party for the failure of COP XV.  It was an 
unrealistic expectation, especially given the economic context of 2009, for developed 
countries to take on the financial burden of combating climate change for the entire 
world.  It was equally as unrealistic to expect developing countries to rubber-stamp a 
resolution hammered out in private by industrialized countries.  Compounding the issue 
were the domestic pressures on the two largest CO2 emitters in the world, US and China, 
to not reduce emissions.  It may have just been the case that COP XV had too lofty of 
expectations at the wrong time.  The COP in Copenhagen did make clear, though, that the 
diplomatic hurdles to a multilateral resolution were high and numerous, and the 
international community, if it were to revisit the issue, would have to change its strategy.  
COP XV in Copenhagen was the capstone of nearly a decade and a half of unsuccessful 
climate negotiations.   
 
Starting from Scratch 
 There were two fundamental issues with negotiations up to 2009.  The first issue 
was the chasm of difference between how developed countries and developing countries 
wanted to deal with the issue.  The second was that the two big polluters, US and China, 
were unwilling to address their own CO2 emissions in a serious way, mostly for domestic 
reasons.  Moreover, the failure of COP XV left multilateral climate negotiations in a bad 
place.  Mistrust was bred in developing nations towards industrialized nations.  Any 
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progress that had been made in building an international coalition of both developed and 
developing states to combat climate change had been lost.   
 While momentum on the issue had stalled on the multilateral front, the Obama 
Administration did not want to give up.  Obama, a liberal Democrat, saw climate change 
as a serious issue and hoped to move aggressively to address it.  But the failure of 
Copenhagen must have been a seriously sobering moment for the newly elected 
president.   
 By the time Obama had taken office, bilateral relations with China were of 
significant importance.  Climate change was an issue that the Chinese were not 
particularly interested in discussing too thoroughly, but the Obama Administration 
repeatedly made it a centerpiece issue whenever the two countries had formal and 
informal meetings.  According to Jeffrey Bader, then the administration’s senior director 
for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, states that Obama consistently and 
enthusiastically raised the issue of climate change every chance.69 Indeed, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton made bilateral climate change negotiations a centerpiece of the 
widely publicized ‘pivot’ to Asia, Bader claims.  Despite the energy with which the 
Obama Administration approached the issue, the Chinese remained unwilling to play ball 
with the US on CO2 emission reductions.  The Chinese were unwilling to address their 
CO2 emissions at that time because of their delicate political situation on the domestic 
front.  Obama’s strategy of bilateral climate diplomacy focused on engagement and trust 
building, so the administration took what they could.  In July 2009, representatives of the 
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CCP signed a joint agreement with the US Department of Energy to develop the US-
China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC).  The announcement was a major step in 
the right direction for Obama – it built trust with the Chinese and it was a substantial 
investment by both countries in developing green technology to try to help combat 
climate change.   It was also a signal to the rest of the world that both the Chinese and the 
US were now invested in the fight against climate change.  Momentum continued in 2009 
when it was announced at the US-China Presidential Summit in Beijing that both 
countries would continue to cooperate.70 
 While bilateral research and development is well and good, the CERC agreement 
between the two countries only amounted to a piecemeal bandage.  The Chinese were 
still avoiding the real hurdle that needed to be overcome, CO2 emission reductions.  
Additionally, it is not as if the U.S. was aggressively moving to reduce emissions 
themselves.  The Obama Administration was spending its political capital on other issues, 
namely health care reform, and Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives in 
the 2010 midterm elections, complicating any legislative efforts to combat climate 
change.  In fact, Judith A Layzer, an environmental policy academic, argues that the 
Great Recession of 2008 prevented Obama from pursuing climate change reforms.71  
Essentially, the dire straits of the economy were a more valuable political issue than 
climate change for a first-term president who faced reelection, argues Layzer.  The 
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Administration was forced to spend their political capital on more immediately pressing 
political concerns that climate change. Additionally, there was to be a new leader in 
Beijing in 2012. 
 Regardless, the bilateral cooperation in 2009 was significant.  The two biggest 
CO2 emitters in the world, and the leaders of developing and developed countries, had 
made significant progress in their diplomatic efforts.  Their progress was also more 
substantial then any progress made in Copenhagen.  The bilateral cooperation between 
the two countries highlighted a potential new path for international climate diplomacy.  
The Obama Administration probably realized this, and they consciously decided to take 
the ball and run. 
 
Xi the Realist 
 Obama’s ambition to address climate change was clear.  In both his 2008 and 
2012 presidential campaigns, he ran on the promise of making America greener, and to 
lead the rest of the world to do the same.  Losing the House of Representatives in 2010 
was a major blow to the Obama Administration, effectively ruining any chance to pass 
climate change legislation.  However, this would not dampen his resolve to do all he 
could, especially after his reelection in 2012. 
 The priorities of the Chinese were much different than the US, though.  The 
illiberality of the regime in China put pressure on the government to keep people happy 
to avoid social unrest.  Central to the CCP’s strategy was ensuring that China’s economy 
continued to grow rapidly, and to propel more and more of its citizens out of poverty.  
For decades economic success had been a central element of the CCP’s legitimacy.  The 
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core element of their economic development after the turn of the century had been their 
production of heavy industrial materials, such as cement and metals.  The unintended 
consequence of this heavy-industry led economic growth, though, had been a massive 
uptick in CO2 emissions.  The environmental damage done by Chinese CO2 emissions 
were substantial and unlikely to be reversed at any point soon.  This was not much of a 
concern for the CCP at the time. 
 This calculus started to change in a serious way in 2012, though.  Xi Jinping had 
been selected as the new president in 2012.  His entry into the position was of great 
importance – he was the leader of a ‘risen’ China.  The entrance of Xi Jinping into 
China’s top position also marked a serious turning point in how China approached 
climate change.  As argued by Lichao He, a political scientist specializing in Chinese 
foreign policy, the Chinese approach to most international issues (especially with regards 
to climate change because of its link to economic production) had been an emphasis on 
its own national interest.72 Xi kept with these realist roots of Chinese politics, but the 
‘national interest’ was no longer as simple as economic growth at any cost.   
 The issue of air pollution in China had increasingly become a hot political topic.  
Beijing was the host of the Summer Olympics in 2008 – this highlighted the air pollution 
issue to the international community, and was a cause of great embarrassment for the 
Chinese nation.  The scientific community was increasingly examining links between 
smog from pollution and a growing number of cases of lung cancer, respiratory illness, 
and cardiovascular disease.  Bringing China out of the smog, and to a developed, 
services-based, low carbon economy is critical to the new 21st century strategy of China. 
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 The problem of air pollution in China was caused by China’s uncapped emissions.  
Interestingly enough, the domestic strategy to reduce deadly air pollution overlaps with 
the international strategy to combat climate change.  Both issues necessitated a reduction 
in CO2 emissions and investment in geo-engineering research and development.  In the 
classical sense of the phrase, by reducing emissions and investing in research and 
development the Chinese could kill two birds with one stone. 
 Xi Jinping, following the typical Chinese foreign policy tenant of realism, made 
his number one foreign policy priority of pursuing the national interest on the 
international scene.  This basic strategy had not changed.  According to Wuqiriletu, a 
Chinese academic, what had changed was the national interest – tackling the now 
notorious air pollution issue had become almost as prominent of an issue as maintaining 
economic growth.  Xi’s duty as President was to shepherd his country from a rising 
power to a developed country.  Improving the population’s quality of life no longer was 
as simple as bringing people out of poverty – quality of life now also relied on quality of 
living conditions.73 
 This shift by no means meant that China would suddenly become an activist 
player on the international climate diplomacy scene.  But what was significant in terms of 
the prospects for bilateral negotiations is that China now seemed poised to address its 
CO2 emissions in the near future.  The new challenge for the Obama administration was 
to try to convince the incoming President Xi Jinping that it was in China’s national 
interest to approach the issue bilaterally.   
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A Climate of Mistrust 
 Obama’s reelection in 2012 seemed to be at least somewhat of an endorsement of 
his climate policy by the American public – at least enough to provide some renewed 
momentum to the issue.  However, the campaign platform for Obama’s reelection did not 
feature climate change prominently, at least relative to other issues.  Obama’s reelection 
seemed more of an endorsement for his health care, economic policies, social values and 
counterterrorism policies than his stance on CO2 emissions.  Regardless, the Obama 
Administration hoped to feature the issue of climate change prominently at its meetings 
with newly enshrined President Xi Jinping of China.  In fact, prior to 2012 the Obama 
Administration had seen much more success in bilateral negotiations with China than at 
multilateral negotiations at COP summits. 
 Unfortunately, diplomacy is a limited resource.  There is only so much territory 
two countries can cover in a meeting or summit.  Much to the chagrin of the Obama 
Administration, the prominent issues featured at US-Chinese diplomatic sessions were 
widely unrelated to climate change.  Obama and Xi had met on numerous occasions in 
the lead up to February of 2014.  According Bonnie Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, other major international issues squeezed 
out any progress to be made on climate change.  Glaser and Vitello summarize bilateral 
diplomacy of being dominated by a variety of non-climate issues, such as maritime land 
disputes; Russia’s seizure of Crimea; and North Korea’s nuclear weapons; and cyber 
security issues.74 These contemporary events all took place in a context of already 
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seriously complicated bilateral relations between the US and China.  The two intertwined 
giants of the world have for both of their modern histories been at philosophical odds, 
and seemingly in constant dispute over issues ranging from Japan to Taiwan.  Given this 
context, bilateral negotiations between the two countries remained a difficult process.  In 
fact, according to Glaser and Vitello, bilateral relations between the two countries can 
become so tense that meetings can culminate into shouting matches, as had happened 
between then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan 
in April of 2014. 
 The hot button political issues of 2014 were sure to seriously pressure the 
relationship between the US and China, and for that matter Obama and Xi.  If any 
bilateral action on climate change were to be accomplished, it would take an effort for 
both governments to compartmentalize unrelated issues and concentrate their efforts on a 
constructive cause.  The year of 2014 would seriously test the leadership ability of both 
Obama and Xi. 
 
Where there is a Will there is a Way 
Given the nature of the foreign policy bureaucracies of both the US and China, 
compartmentalization of the climate change issue would not be impossible at the lower 
levels of the bureaucratic chain of command.  In other words, specific organizations 
within diplomatic departments tasked with specific diplomatic issues would continue to 
explore resolution with minimal interference from other areas of the bureaucracy.  In 
essence, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was not the US spearhead diplomat for 
international climate change issues.  The challenge then is the approval of action by 
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lower-level bureaucrats by their superiors.  Any diplomatic initiative would only be 
successful in so far as it successfully works its way up the bureaucratic chain of 
command.    
In the beginning part of 2014, the point man on climate negotiations for the US 
Department of State was Todd Stern.  According to Jeff Goodell, a reporter for Rolling 
Stone Magazine who was present at numerous climate negotiation meetings between the 
US and China in 2014, Stern made an exploratory call to his Chinese counterpart, Xie 
Zhenhua.  At the time, Stern was due to meet with newly appointed Secretary of State 
John Kerry and top Chinese officials in a matter of days.  According to Goodell, Stern 
had made the case to both Xie and Kerry that if any progress could be made between the 
two countries, it may help build momentum for the issue going into COP XXI in Paris the 
following year.   
Goodell claims that while Xie was interested, there were two major roadblocks 
holding back the Chinese.  The first was their status as a developing economy struggling 
with poverty.  China felt at the time that they had bigger domestic issues in front of them 
than CO2 emissions.  Also holding the Chinese back was the issue of trust – according to 
Orville Schell, the head of the Center on US-China Relations at the Asia Society in New 
York, the Chinese were anxious that climate change could be used as a strategic issue by 
the US to hold back a rising China.  According to John Podesta, a key aide to President 
Obama at the time, despite this context Obama gave the State Department the thumbs up 
to pursue negotiations with the Chinese when Kerry and Stern were in China to meet with 
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President Xi.  Podesta claims that while Xi thought that the idea was interesting, he 
showed no interest in actually pursuing any sort of ‘deal.’75 
 
The Power of Persuasion 
 The Obama Administration may or may not have perceived mistrust as the source 
of difficulty in climate negotiations.  Regardless, mistrust would have to be reduced if 
any progress were to be made.  To help alleviate mistrust between the two countries, 
Obama personally sought to improve his relationship with his counterpart, President Xi.  
First, in mid-march, President Obama sent a personal letter to President Xi urging 
bilateral action to combat climate change.76 In doing so, Obama was using his persona 
and relationship with President Xi to try to persuade China that the US was sincerely 
interested in focusing bilateral efforts on combating climate change solely for the benefit 
of the globe.  This undoubtedly highlighted to Xi that Obama probably had an express 
desire to make political process on combating climate change.  What it could not 
accomplish was giving China reassurance that the US was not pursuing negations as an 
effort to contain China. 
 Who could blame them?  To that point, the US had not passed any serious climate 
change legislation, had been involved in the mangling of past multilateral efforts, and had 
been at odds with Beijing on a variety of issues of the past few years.  What China really 
needed to see was that the US was willing to hurt itself economically in order to address 
the issue.  This would show a seriousness that the US had lacked in the past. 
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 Enter the second term version of President Obama.  While during Obama’s first 
term, he was timid to make political moves that may contribute to attacks during his 
reelection campaign (one can envision Republican candidates decrying his ‘economy-
killing environmental policy’).  Unbound by reelection pressures, Obama followed 
through in 2014 with aggressive new initiatives to combat climate change.  Chief among 
these plans was the Climate Change Mitigation Action Plan, spearheaded by the EPA, 
which would role out new expansive regulations on emissions from a variety of sources.77 
He also implored the Department of Energy and Department of Transportation to 
implement new emissions standards.  While these moves were implemented through 
executive action and lacked the bite that legislation would, the reforms were substantial 
enough to cause a litany of protest from interest groups, including an article published in 
the Weekly Standard by President and CEO of the US Chamber of Commerce Thomas J. 
Donohue.78 
 Between personal correspondence and domestic reform, Obama was making clear 
to the international community, especially to China, that the US was serious about 
combating climate change, and that it would pursue unilateral climate change actions if it 
had to.  Would this be enough to persuade the Chinese to enter negotiations?   
 
Back to the Negotiating Table 
 A few weeks after the Obama Administration rolled out its new executive plan for 
domestic climate change action, US diplomats, including Sec. John Kerry, Secretary of 
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Energy Ernest Moniz, Podesta, and Stern, attended the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
in Beijing.  High-level counterparts in China, including Xie Zhenhua and Vice Premier 
Zhang Gaoli, would host the meeting.  While no formal negotiations occurred related to 
climate change, reporter Jeff Goodell, who was attending the conference, said that US 
officials were seriously hopeful that progress would be made.   
 Things did not work out well, though.  According to Goodell, the Chinese were 
unconvinced that they could make any promises until 2015, probably an allusion to the 
COP XXI conference in Paris in late 2015.  The US diplomats left China in a ‘somber 
mood,’ Goodell claims.75 During the second week of September, Obama sent a second 
letter to Xi suggesting that the two countries could make a significant announcement at 
the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in regards to a bilateral 
agreement to combat climate change.76  
 Alas, it seemed personal correspondence was once again used to no avail.  
President Xi was notably absent from the UN Climate Summit in New York later that 
month.  To the Obama Administration, this must have been completely disheartening.  
The Administration knew from the experience of COP XV in Copenhagen that without 
some sort of bilateral commitments between the US and China, COP XXI in Paris would 
be no different.   
 
From Red Dragon to Green Dragon: Xi’s Change of Heart 
 These must have been very difficult times for President Xi.  On the one hand, his 
country’s economy was booming, and had been for some time, propelling the nation to 
great power status.  Meanwhile, the US seemed to be trying to counter China militarily 
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and diplomatically with regards to every issue, except for climate change, the one issue 
that cooperation would damage China’s economy.  On the other hand, his country was 
the leading CO2 emitter in the world – this had the combined effect of creating 
international pressures to participate in multilateral climate diplomacy; while 
simultaneously having to deal with a horrific and deadly air pollution issue caused by the 
same sources emitting all of China’s CO2.   
 According to Lyle Goldstein, a professor at the US Naval War College and a 
China scholar, the degradation of China’s ecology and its air pollution issue had become 
too big of a political issue for President Xi to ignore.  Sometime in 2014, Xi must have 
come to the conclusion that a climate agreement with the US would accomplish the 
separate goals of pleasing the international community, and help reduce the effects of air 
pollution.  However, any agreement needed to include some key caveats.  The promises 
of any agreement could not be too burdensome or binding for China; the agreement must 
focus equally on geo-engineering and green technology research and development with 
CO2 emission pledges; and the US must also show that it is serious about combating 
climate change.  Most importantly, though, the Chinese must make emissions cuts on its 
own terms, and the US would need to do more relative to China in solving the problem 
because of the countries respective development statuses.79 The latter point would be the 
greatest source of contention with the US. 
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Picking Battles, Winning Wars 
 President Xi’s absence at the UN Climate Summit in New York was widely 
interpreted by observers as a snub to bilateral climate diplomacy to the US.  Despite the 
initial doubts about a prospective US-Chinese agreement, the senior Chinese official 
attending the summit Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli reached out to President Obama and 
expressed President Xi’s desire to announce an agreement at the aforementioned APEC 
Summit, according to Goodell.75 This announcement marked the first simultaneous 
expression of interest by both parties to announce a coordinated, coherent agreement to 
combat climate change.   
 According to Goodell, both Podesta and Stern traveled to Beijing in late October.  
At this meeting, the Chinese put firm numbers on the negotiating table.  First hand 
accounts provided to Goodell claim that the Chinese were willing to cap their CO2 
emissions by 2030.  On the flip side, the US was willing to commit to cut net greenhouse 
gas emissions 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025.80 To do so, the US was promising that 
the Obama Administration would carry out its previously rolled out executive actions 
combating climate change, and to pursue further executive action by the end of his 
second term.  
 The fallout in the US was considerable.  As recalled by Goodell, the initial 
reaction of the negotiators was negative.  The US negotiators were not content with what 
they believed to be a somewhat lackluster Chinese proposition.  They had hoped for 
‘sometime sooner than 2030,’ according to Podesta.  Podesta, adds that the Chinese had 
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claimed that the 2030 mark was the date cleared by the CCP Standing Committee.  This 
implied that there was not to be negotiation on the Chinese figure, and that the US needed 
to simply approve or disapprove of the number. 
 While the US negotiators felt that the Chinese had promised a lighter figure than 
the US, they decided to accept the terms of the agreement and send them up to the 
President.  The following evening, President Obama and President Xi met privately to 
discuss the negotiations.  They both agreed to the deal, and promised to maintain a 
dialogue about this issue throughout the year towards Paris.  The agreement was 
announced at the APEC Summit on November 11, 2014.   
President Obama and President Xi jointly announced USCCP on November 12, 
2014, at the APEC Summit in Beijing.81  According to a White House Press Release from 
the day of the announcement, US agreed to reduce its emissions by 26%-28% below its 
2005 level by 2025.82  Based on EPA statistics, a 26%-28% cut of emissions based on 
2005 statistics would amount to about reduction of 1,910-2,057 million metric tons of 
CO2 emissions annually by 2025.83  The Press Release also included an announcement 
that the Chinese had promised to cap the annual growth of emissions by 2030.  
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Additionally, the agreement introduces some new joint efforts by both countries to 
improve geo-engineering research and development. 
What is especially notable about the White House Press Release is its language 
related to broader international climate diplomacy.  Based on the text of the Press 
Release, it is immediately clear that the Obama Administration saw USCCP as a critical 
component of quickening the pace and progress of multilateral negotiations.  Stated in 
section four of the Press Release is the joint ‘hope’ that target announcements would 
‘inject momentum’ into multilateral climate negotiations.  This provision will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
Before diving into the USCCP in a larger context, the explicit targets by both 
countries must be analyzed.  Specifically, how much is each country giving up, and is this 
enough?  Moreover, while the spirit of this particular agreement is laudably non-
confrontational, an agreement like this invariably will produce good and bad results for 
both sides of the negotiating table, especially when other bilateral issues of the US-China 
relationship are taken into account.  Therefore, a critical analysis of the agreement as a 
stand-alone item is necessary.   
 
The US and USCCP 
 Immediately after the announcement of the agreement, the Obama Administration 
got a wide range of feedback.  Former Vice President and ardent environmentalist Al 
Gore was quick to praise the announcement, describing it as ‘groundbreaking.’  Sen. 
Mitch McConnell decried the agreement and claimed it requires the Chinese to do 
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‘nothing for 16 years’ while US environmental regulations were causing ‘havoc’ across 
the US.   
 Much of the criticism of the agreement was well founded. Jillian Melchior, a 
writer for National Review, was quick to point out one of the deal’s major flaws.  
Melchior argues that based on the terms of the agreement, serious and substantial 
progress by the Chinese is unlikely.  Melchior believes that economic factors in China 
present a major hurdle for any hope of reform in China.  The legitimacy of the CCP rests 
on economic development, and CO2 emission reductions would probably slow China’s 
economy.  Concern in Beijing for popular support may at any point derail the Chinese 
commitment from the USCCP.84 
 While Melchior’s argument somewhat ignores the evolving calculus of the CCP 
as to what exactly what their ‘legitimacy’ rests on – specifically, the rising importance of 
non-economic factors involved in quality of life, especially in relation to air pollution – 
she highlights an important issue with the agreement.  The agreement is completely 
voluntary, and either party can break their promise at any time without fear of formal 
repercussions.   While Melchior’s critique focused on the wishy-washiness of the Chinese 
side, the non-binding nature of the agreement also has implications for US.  The 2016 
presidential election looms large over international climate negotiations. If a Republican 
candidate were elected to office (and followed up on campaign promises), the agreement 
would undoubtedly be shredded very early in 2017.  This is an entirely possible outcome. 
 The agreement could not have been binding.  The Chinese, at least in 2014, had 
no interest in sacrificing their much-cherished sovereignty.  The US political landscape 
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would have prevented any legally binding resolution, whether in Congress or elsewhere, 
so it was not even worth pursuing.  These excuses, though, do not change the fact that 
this agreement has no legally binding teeth.  It therefore amounts to a promise between 
two countries with their fingers crossed behind their backs.  That is especially concerning 
considering the two countries being discussed have been notoriously half-hearted on 
climate change issues throughout most of the 21st century.  
 The lack of a legally binding provision can be chalked up as a loss for the US.  
While US itself did not pursue a legally binding provision, this decision was made 
because it was impossible, not because it was undesired.  The Obama Administration, 
given its desire to fulfill a leadership position, would undoubtedly favor binding 
provisions (especially if the US themselves did not have to commit to said provisions) 
because it would make their job easier in that once an agreement was made, it could not 
be reneged, so continual pressure would not have to be applied to ensure a country 
voluntarily implemented such an agreement.  The current administration would probably 
be in favor of permanent commitments by both sides, but the lack of such commitments 
highlights the weakness of the international climate diplomacy regime, and will remain a 
major liability for years to come. 
 As for the specific commitments made by US, a major criticism has been that they 
are inadequate.  Henry Fountain and John Schwartz, writing for the New York Times, 
assert that US commitments are nothing new and amount to the US promise as a simple 
continuation of policies already in place.  Moreover, they claim that climate experts 
overwhelmingly agree that the agreement is not nearly aggressive enough to ensure that 
global warming stays under 2 degrees Celsius, a widely adopted goal by the international 
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community and the UNFCCC.85 If any larger multilateral effort to combat climate change 
were not accomplished, this deal would amount to a pebble-sized solution to a boulder-
sized problem. 
 The agreement goes a long way in one important respect.  Geo-engineering 
research and development will remain a pivotal component of any strategy to combat 
climate change going forward.  USCCP establishes multiple provisions that expand 
cooperation between the US and China in geo-engineering research and development.  
Firstly, the agreement reaffirms the commitment by both countries to fund and utilize the 
jointly founded and operated Clean Energy Research Center.  Secondly, the agreement 
establishes a new joint project to be based in China.  The project is the construction of a 
major new carbon storage facility funded by a public-private consortium.  This 
technology, already employed in small scales across the globe, involves CO2 from power 
plants or industrial processes, then compressing the CO2 and transporting it via pipeline 
to a facility that can then inject it into rock formations a mile or more under Earth’s 
surface, where it is trapped.  A carbon storage facility, if successful, would amount to 
CO2 emission reductions without the negative economic consequences (the combustion 
product CO2 would be captured before entering Earth’s atmosphere).  Moreover, the 
agreement calls for a variety of smaller measures, including the Climate-Smart City 
Initiative, which would give local leaders from across the world a forum for discussion 
about best practices. 
 Beyond investment in geo-engineering, USCCP as a stand-alone document seems 
a far cry from success for the US.  Firstly, any commitments made are not commitments 
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at all, rather promises from two world leaders who will not be in office when the target 
year for full implementation comes around.  The agreement lacks any legally binding 
teeth, and can therefore be declared null and void by a new presidential administration of 
either country.  Secondly, the non-commitment commitments made by the US are mostly 
insufficiently solving climate change without bolder international action, which based on 
past experience is a difficult task unto itself.  Thirdly, despite the weakness of US 
commitments, the commitments from China are substantially weaker – from negotiations 
the US agreed to a pact that required much more of it than its counterpart.  USCCP, then, 
seems a textbook example of a failure agreement for the US.  That is, only if the larger 
context and implicit goals of the agreement are not considered. 
 
China and USCCP 
 If the USCCP as a stand-alone document was a blundering dud of an agreement 
for US, it is a game-changing and overwhelmingly positive agreement for China.  The 
international community largely saw China as having taken a responsible step.  
Moreover, China has agreed to start addressing the serious issue of coal burning as the 
majority source of energy in its country.  But most importantly for the Chinese, they 
maintain flexibility and sovereignty of their climate change goals and strategies. 
 Bob Sussman of Brookings Institution argues that the deal for the Chinese is ‘not 
a free-ride,’ and indeed this is a good thing.  The agreement is in itself a first step for the 
Chinese in addressing serious issues related to their reliance on coal burning, chief among 
them air pollution and climate change.  In fact, Sussman argues, fulfilling the agreement 
will require immediate action and long-term planning by the Chinese government.  This 
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is especially true as the Chinese set a goal for themselves to reach 20% of total energy 
production coming from non-emitting power sources (nuclear and renewables) – a 
particularly immediate challenge given that the current percentage of total energy 
production coming from nuclear and renewables is about 10%, and new construction of 
these energy source facilities will take years to complete and become operational.86 To 
cap emissions growth by 2030, China will need to move aggressively to reduce its 
reliance on coal. Doing so would improve progress on combating climate change, and it 
would also help reduce deadly air pollution over major cities, an increasingly pesky issue 
for the CCP.  
 So for the Chinese, the agreements made in the USCCP are certainly a step in the 
right direction in addressing serious issues on the dashboard of the Chinese government.  
But what really makes this deal good for China is the fact that it is non-binding.  
Truthfully, it is almost certain the Chinese would have never have even considered 
signing an agreement with legally binding provisions.  The voluntary nature of the 
agreement gives the Chinese flexibility to reform their emissions.  They can pursue 
strategies that they see as fit to their situation.  Moreover, if momentum for combating 
climate change fizzles and/or China no longer sees reducing emissions as a priority, they 
are free to take the lid off of emissions at any time.  Given the USCCP, doing so would 
undoubtedly draw a major outcry from the international community – but pleasing the 
international community is not the main priority of the CCP.  If anything, this non-
binding agreement will continue to offer China much choice going forward.  If China 
                                                
86 Sussman, Bob.  “The U.S.-China Climate Deal: Not a Free-Ride for the Chinese.”  
Brookings.  25 November 2015.  Web. 
 107 
sees future action as worthwhile, they will pursue that course.  If not, they have the 
option of pursuing a different strategy.   
 Given the outcome of negotiations, it would certainly seem that China came out in 
a better position than the US.  However, this agreement was not signed in a vacuum, and 
further analysis must be put in the context of international climate diplomacy in the past, 
present, and future.  The USCCP is a part of a larger context. 
 
Beyond Targets 
 It is unfair to criticize the US based solely on the negotiations and text of the 
USCCP.  Within the very text of the agreement that seems so bad for the US, the US 
expresses its interests as a part of a bigger picture.  Section Four of The White House 
Press Release82 on USCCP reads: 
The United States and China hope that by announcing these targets now, they 
can inject momentum into the global climate negotiations and inspire other 
countries to join in coming forward with ambitious actions as soon as possible, 
preferably by the first quarter of 2015. The two Presidents resolved to work 
closely together over the next year to address major impediments to reaching a 
successful global climate agreement in Paris. 
 
This component of the USCCP is the articulation of the Administration’s shift in climate 
negotiation strategy.  
 To review, there were a few reasons as to why previous attempts at multilateral 
climate negotiations failed – the chasm between developed and developing countries and 
the ‘malignancy of the great polluters’ chief among them.  In completing the USCCP, US 
and China hoped to resolve these two issues.  Firstly, both countries hoped to lead their 
respective blocs towards a settlement of the pervasive developed versus developing issue.  
 108
Secondly, both countries hoped the agreement would signal that the big polluters were 
now proactively engaged with the issue, as opposed to the past stance of disinterest.  
 Thus, the most important metric for evaluating USPCC is the level to which it 
successfully galvanized multilateral climate negotiation efforts after its announcement.  
Specifically, as is stated in the pact itself, COP XXI in Paris, France in December 2015 
should result in substantial progress.    
 
Conclusion 
 The success of the US-China Climate Pact of November 2014 will be judged 
based on the success of future multilateral negotiations.  Specifically, both countries’ 
representatives (especially the US) were negotiating while looking ahead to the COP XXI 
in Paris in late 2015.  Additionally, any success in the future is not earned on a win-lose 
basis.   Both parties to the agreement began negotiations with differing goals, but parallel 
interests - the resolution of those differences in order to satisfy both parties was a wise 
diplomatic move.   
 What makes the US-China Climate Pact (USCCP) so promising and unique is that 
it represents a change of strategy in international climate negotiations.  The failure of 
Kyoto and Copenhagen highlighted major gaps between the developed countries and 
developing countries, and to move forward with multilateral negotiations, the supposed 
leaders of both blocs needed to lead their respective corners to the negotiating table.  
Most important are the results that the USCCP led to, or failed to lead to, to at COP XXI 
in Paris, France, in December 2015.   
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 This negotiation not being a win-lose scenario does not protect the involved 
parties from failure.  In the case of the US, President Obama hoped that the agreement 
would have serious implications going into COP XXI.  Based on the initial disdain 
portrayed by the US negotiators, the President was probably not pleased with the specific 
numbers put up by the Chinese, but agreed to the USCCP anyway.  He had already 
pursued domestic climate reform, at least to the degree to which it was possible, and 
hoped to have success on the multilateral front.  Remembering the immense failure of 
Copenhagen, the President saw the USCCP as a critical step in consoling differences 
throughout the international community.  In this context, the President will be judged by 
whether or not he is able to successfully lead the international community to its first 
substantial multilateral success to combat climate change.   
 For President Xi, there was undoubtedly a tremendous amount of pressure to act.  
He faced stiff international pressure (much of it applied by the Obama Administration) to 
participate in bilateral negotiations.  Reducing air pollution from burning coal must have 
also been increasingly seen as an important goal to President Xi.  It is easy to see 
President Xi as having come out in a good position from these negotiations – he took a 
positive step towards combating the issue in the eyes of the international community, 
while also maintaining a lot of time – 15 years to be specific - to cap CO2 emissions.  
This will allow the CCP flexibility in the future to address air pollution in their way for 
the near future.  President Xi may have lost some of this flexibility depending on the 
results of future climate change negotiations, but at least it provides him with options.  
Moreover, it is entirely conceivable that President Xi sees climate change as a serious 
international issue, and wants to be a part of addressing it. 
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 The important question then becomes, how did climate diplomacy develop over 
the next year?  Moreover, what goals are laid forth in the coming COP summits, and are 
these goals substantial enough to combat climate change?   
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Chapter V: Twenty-First Try is the Charm 
 On Monday, August 31, 2015, President Obama began a three-day trip across the 
state of Alaska – and importantly, he visited the quickly receding Artic coastline, home to 
dozens of indigenous communities.  While the scenery may have been breathtaking, the 
purpose the President had when he took this trip was to highlight the present effects of 
climate change to the American public.  With civil war raging on in Syria and the 
Russian military incursion into Ukraine, amongst other hot-topic international issues, the 
President’s trip to Alaska highlighted his personal devotion to the topic of climate 
change.  On the same Monday as the President’s trip to Alaska, the start of a the final 
round of minor negotiations was taking place in Bonn, Germany, to try to hammer out the 
fine details of how the ever important COP XXI in Paris, the next global climate summit 
would take place.  The stage, quite literally, was set – and the results of COP XXI were 
likely to define Obama’s climate change legacy. 
  
Join the Club 
Over a year separated the announcement of USCCP and COP XXI in Paris.  The 
Obama Administration undoubtedly hoped to continue improving conditions going into 
COP XXI.  Indeed, with 2016 being President Obama’s final year in office, Paris seemed 
to be the Administration’s final opportunity to complete meaningful multilateral 
negotiations.  Now that strategy had formally changed, the critical issue for the Obama 
Administration moving forward was enhancing international conditions in a way that 
improved the chances of success in Paris.  Reinforcing and executing the provisions of 
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the agreement with China, and perhaps adding to the agreement, would doubtless be a 
chief objective for the Administration. 
 Additionally, opening the agreement to others would be helpful.  Scott Victor 
Valentine, a professor at the University of Hong Kong, argued in 2012 that for bilateral 
negotiations between the US and China to be meaningful in the fight against climate 
change, the same bilateral negotiations would have to happen throughout the international 
community, creating a network of agreements and commitments that multilateral 
negotiations could build on.  While Valentine was skeptical in 2012 of the prospects of 
successful bilateral negotiations, he did make clear in his arguments in 2012 that an 
agreement between these two countries should be sufficiently significant to start the 
engine on the same style of negotiations elsewhere.87 Behind Valentine’s logic is the 
developed-developing divide.  Until Paris, it would be unknown to the US and China if 
their bilateral agreement alone would be substantial enough to bridge this divide, so to 
enhance prospects it would be wise to seek similar agreements elsewhere. 
The Obama Administration seemed to concur with Valentine’s thoughts.  There 
seemed to be no downside to pursuing similar agreements, and the upside would be 
added momentum for Paris.  First, though, the US needed to find a developing country to 
play ball with. 
A willing partner emerged in the summer of 2015.  Brazilian President Dilma 
Rousseff, in a meeting with President Obama, expressed her desire to join the US and 
China in the bilateral (soon to be trilateral) commitment.  The meeting with President 
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Rousseff did not include the drawn out deliberations and fanfare of the US-China 
negotiations.  Not unlike the US’ commitments, it is likely that the commitments made by 
President Rousseff had already been in the pipeline.  Regardless, the Obama 
Administration and President Xi were happy to include Brazil on their sides.  President 
Rousseff agreed to pledge that Brazil would increase production of electricity from 
renewable sources to represent 20% of electricity production by 2030.  President Obama 
surprisingly pledged the same with President Rousseff, adding to the previously 
described commitments in USCCP.88 Additionally, Brazil agreed to restore 30 million 
acres of Amazon rain forest, an important source of sinks.89 Despite the extension of new 
US pledges, the Chinese did not mirror the US, and stood pat on what they had already 
agreed to – undoubtedly a disappointing, but not unforeseen, stance to the Obama 
Administration. 
USCCP seemed to have desired effects even before COP XXI, then.  If the stated 
goal of the agreement was to reinvigorate international efforts, adding Brazil, at the time 
the tenth largest emitter of CO2 in the world, certainly was a big step in the reinvigoration 
process.  Brazil’s addition to the USCCP was significant in another way – Brazil, a major 
developing economy and member of the BRICs club, struck an agreement with the US, a 
major developed economy.  The prospect of bridging the gap between developed and 
developing countries before COP XXI seemed better after this announcement. 
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Which Way China? 
 An uncomfortable sense of uncertainty was pervasive in the beginning months of 
2015.  Such uncertainty was inevitable given the vagueness of the Chinese commitments 
and the lack of any specific policy direction laid out by the CCP.  President Xi probably 
was aware of this, but that is not what mattered for him.  The chief priority for President 
Xi is the domestic interest, almost invariably.  President Xi and the CCP would only 
begin to implement reforms if they felt strongly enough about the pollution issue.  
 In mid-September of 2015, new clarity began entering the picture.  President Xi 
announced a round of new reforms - most significant amongst them was an ambitious 
national emissions trading system (also known as cap and trade), to be launched in 
2017.90 Joshua P. Meltzer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that 
China’s announcement was a huge boost of momentum for COP XXI in Paris.  The 
announcement stressed the importance of an ambitious and successful outcome from 
Paris.  Moreover, the proactivity of the announcement raised the prospects for further 
ambitious and impromptu announcements.  In 2014, China agreed to do the bare 
minimum.  In 2015, China began to move more boldly and voluntarily toward combatting 
climate change.  As Meltzer argues, this was a momentous occasion.91  Additionally, one 
of the main sticking points in Copenhagen was how the international community should 
plan to fight climate change.  The developed countries hoped to utilize market 
mechanisms, like the aforementioned cap-and-trade plan the Chinese announced in 2015.  
In Copenhagen, the community of developing countries outright refused the utility, or at 
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least that they had any obligation, of pursuing such strategies.  The announcement of the 
Chinese cap-and-trade plan was a significant derivation of such a previous stance.  It 
would be entirely possible that this policy could become a model for other developing 
countries. 
 One can speculate that there may be another factor driving Chinese participation.  
China over the past decades has emerged as one of the world’s great powers.  It is one of 
the largest economies in the world; it has a rapidly developing society; it is increasing its 
military presence in the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere; and one can assume that it sees 
itself as a major player in international relations.  It is entirely possible, if not probable, 
that the Chinese wanted to take this opportunity to be seen as a leader on the international 
stage.  Whether this is an conscious or unconscious motivation (if it is actually a 
motivation at all) will remain unknown.  Regardless of their motivations, though, the 
strides the Chinese took to present themselves as a serious party in combating climate 
change were crucial heading into Paris. 
 
The Stage is Set 
 The context of climate negotiations had changed dramatically between 
Copenhagen and Paris.  Firstly, the two great polluters, US and China, had agreed to a 
bilateral pledge that both countries would move to aggressively address their CO2 
emissions.  This was a major shift.  For the US, domestic politics had prevented any 
action on climate change from the failure of Kyoto up until the beginning of President 
Obama’s second term in office.  For China, a CO2 emissions cap by 2030 and a soon-to-
be-implemented cap-and-trade system signaled its seriousness in addressing air pollution. 
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Also, as argued by Sam Geall, a research fellow at the University of Sussex writing for 
Foreign Policy, these policies illuminate a turnaround in the Chinese economy from 
energy-intensive industries towards a services-based economy – indeed, argues Geall, 
China’s coal consumption fell by 2.9% between 2013 and 2015, and continues to fall, a 
major change from past tried and failed to wean off coal.92 
 While the ‘malignancy of the great polluters’ issue seemed to have been resolved, 
there were two other substantial issues still under dispute.  The first issue is finance.  
Specifically, according to Mythili Sampathkumar, a climate expert writing for Foreign 
Policy, the questions that still remained were which countries would fund a $100 billion 
account to be replenished annually that would be used for damage mitigation by 
vulnerable developing countries.93 
 Another point of contention going into the negotiations would be what the scale 
of emissions reductions for developing countries would be relative to developed 
countries; and how such goals would be implemented.  These were some of the major 
sticking points in Copenhagen, and the issue reemerged in the run up to Paris. 
 
Paris on Edge 
 In the run-up to Paris, the 195 countries to participate in COP XXI submitted 
preliminary CO2 emissions reduction plans to UNFCC.  The goal of these initial 
submissions was to constitute a global plan that would keep average global temperatures 
2 degrees Celsius below pre-industrial levels.  This goal was adopted because it was the 
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point at which more ‘catastrophic’ events were likely to occur, according to the scientific 
community. 
 While most heads of state of the 195 participating countries, including President 
Obama and President Xi, initially attended the opening ceremonies of COP XXI, they 
were quick to depart.  As negotiations were underway, Ben Rhodes, deputy national 
security adviser for President Obama, told the New York Times that the French hosts did 
not want heads of state to reemerge because it would complicate the final rounds of 
negotiations, an issue with Copenhagen.  Rhodes said that all the heads of state dropped 
off their negotiators and went on their merry way.  The negotiators, then, would limit the 
publicity of their deliberations, and try to stay behind closed doors.94 
 Initial disagreements were quick to form.  The same split between developed and 
developing countries that poisoned Copenhagen reemerged.  The first issue that took 
center stage was funding of the aforementioned goal of $100 billion annual fund to 
mitigate the effects of climate change and to mitigate the effects of emissions reductions 
in developing countries.  The second issue was who would bare the burden of the most 
substantial of emissions reductions. 
 To solve this issue, a soft compromise was made.  The developed countries would 
promise to allocate the funds for developing countries efforts of adaptation and 
mitigation.  However, this funding was not made legally binding because it would be 
impossible for US Congress to accept such a deal.  Indeed, according to New York Times 
reports, Sec. John Kerry made clear to his counterparts that if the language of the 
agreement were not changed, specifically by replacing ‘shall’ with ‘should,’ the US could 
                                                
94 Revkin, Andrew C.  “Tracking Views and News Out of the Paris Climate Change 
Talks.”  New York Times.  30 November 2015. 
 118
not accept the deal.  So, the funding section of the agreement was moved from the body 
of the agreement into the preamble section, and its language was changed from ‘shall’ to 
should.’95 
 On the flip side, developed countries acknowledged that they bare the most 
responsibility for curbing emissions.  According to Richi Ahuja, Jonathan Camuzeaux, 
Thomas Sterner, and Gernot Wagner, writing for Foreign Affairs, the justification for this 
acknowledgement was twofold.  Firstly, the participants in the conference accepted the 
principle of ‘grandfathering’ – emissions quotas based on how much each country has 
released in the past.  Since 1970, according to Ahuja et al, US accounts for 23% of CO2 
emissions, China accounts for 14%, EU accounts for 10%, and India accounts for 3%.  
Another factor was a per capita emissions rights system.  The US emits 17 tons of CO2 
per capita, EU emits about 7 tons per capita, China releases just under 7 tons per capita, 
and India releases under 2 tons per capita, claim Ahuja et al.  Grandfathering and per 
capita emissions would serve the basis of divvying up the emissions ‘pie.’96 
 Developed counties would bare the brunt of climate change mitigation efforts by 
funding the adaptation and mitigation strategies of developing countries and slashing 
their emissions more rapidly than their counterparts.  In exchange, developing countries 
agreed that such provisions would be non-binding.  Developed countries would not want 
binding funding provisions because it provided them the flexibility to cut off the stream if 
they felt their money was being misallocated.  On December 12th, 2015, the 195 nations 
participating in the conference agreed to the new accord.  The final provisions included a 
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few highlights.  First, all nations pledged to hold temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels.  Second, all nations pledged to reduce deforestation and 
increase the role of conservation of sustainable management of forests.  Third, developed 
countries would take the lead in mobilizing climate finance.  Fourth, each country 
pledged to update their nationally determined contributions to the fight against climate 
change every five years.  No provisions were made binding by the agreement.97 
 
Better than Nothing 
 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said in an interview after the agreement was 
struck that the agreement was an ‘historic moment,’ and that it was the first ‘truly 
universal agreement’ to combat climate change.  Indeed, the agreement represented major 
progress from Copenhagen.  However, the agreement was flawed in a few ways. 
 Keith Johnson, a senior reporter covering energy policy for Foreign Policy, 
argues that while the Paris agreement was an improvement from Kyoto, it alone is not 
substantial enough to hold temperatures below the 2 degrees Celsius target.  In fact, by 
most estimates, the agreement will hold temperatures below 3 degrees Celsius higher 
than pre-industrial levels.  While the agreement did not meet its stated goal, it did for the 
first time present a hard temperature rise cap.  Moreover, this cap is under the 4 degrees 
Celsius cutoff that scientists have claimed will have disastrous and irreversible effects on 
Earth.  Additionally, the provision stating that each country will revisit their pledges 
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every five years, starting in 2020, offers hope that the international community will one 
day be able to go below the 2 degrees Celsius benchmark.98 
 Johnson also argues that another flaw of the agreement is that it is non-binding.  
Countries are free to renege on their pledges without any legal consequences.  It is very 
likely, though, that a binding agreement was impossible.  The same impediments that 
prevented USCCP from being binding were present throughout the globe, namely 
domestic considerations, and it may just be that the nature of the new international 
climate diplomacy regime will always be voluntary – hopefully the seriousness of the 
effects of climate change implicitly makes countries fulfill their promises.  Additionally, 
even though the agreement is non-binding, it is not merely symbolic.  If a country were to 
renege on their pledges, there would be implications for these countries beyond the 
climate change-negotiating table.  Responsible actors in the regime would be able to try 
to hold irresponsible actors to a standard, using leverage from other issues.  As Otto Von 
Bismark once remarked, “politics is the art of the possible.” 
 While the Paris agreement is flawed in certain aspects, it is clearly a substantial 
step forward from Kyoto and Copenhagen.  As argued by Johnson, this is a truly global 
accord – Kyoto covered only 14% of the world’s CO2 emissions (Copenhagen did not 
expand on this), while the Paris agreement covers 96% of global CO2 emissions.  
Moreover, the Paris accord creates a forum for countries to regularly revisit their pledges, 
and potentially expand on them.  Paris, then, can be considered the end of the beginning 
in the fight against climate change. 
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USCCP Revisited 
 The main goal of USCCP was to provide momentum for COP XXI in Paris.  It 
did just that.  Firstly, though, the USCCP initially seemed a loss for the US – how did 
developments afterwards change that perspective?  One of the main flaws of USCCP for 
the US was that it was not legally binding, so China could renege on their promises at any 
point.  However, with the new seriousness of China in reforming their energy sector, and 
the announcement after USCCP that China would institute a cap-and-trade system in 
2017, the non-binding nature of USCCP seemed less and less important.  It decreasingly 
seemed necessary that China need be coerced to pursue a climate change agenda as they 
began to do so voluntarily. Additionally, if success were to be struck in Paris, the US 
strategy of losing the battle but winning the war would seem to be vindicated.  The Paris 
agreement, seemingly a major success for the global community in fighting climate 
change, justifies this US strategy.  After Paris, the USCCP seems to be not such a bad 
deal for the US, after all. 
 Between the announcement of USCCP and the beginning of COP XXI, China 
announced it would implement a cap-and-trade system.  In Paris, they extended their 
USCCP promises, which looked all the more realistic given the implementation of cap-
and-trade.  So, not much had changed for the Chinese since their seeming success in 
USCCP negotiations, other than voluntary policy implementation. China’s actions on the 
international stage are important, too.  China, a new power in the world, played a critical 
role in leading the world towards establishing an effective regime to combat climate 
change.  Without China’s cooperation and leadership, little progress could have been 
made on the issue.  China, in this case, took on an important global leadership role and 
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established itself as a powerful force in international diplomacy – an important step for a 
newly emergent great power. 
 It is safe to say that without USCCP, COP XXI would have been a failure.  
Firstly, if the US and China were to not have signaled beforehand that they were serious 
about combating climate change there would have been no incentive for lesser emitters to 
join the cause.  This change in pace was initially seen when Brazil joined US and China. 
It culminated in Paris with 195 nations covering 96% of global CO2 emissions 
establishing this new climate change regime.   
 Additionally, progress between the US and China probably helped eliminate some 
mistrust between developed and developing countries that formed in Copenhagen.  While 
the degree to which bilateral cooperation between US and China helped move forward 
multilateral cooperation in Paris is unquantifiable, the compromise between the 
developed and developing countries in Paris was a far better outcome than the bickering 
of Copenhagen.  While other factors may be responsible for this shift, such as the 
increasing vulnerability of developing countries to the effects of climate change, clearly 
something had changed the calculus for these two blocs and caused them to cooperate 
and compromise with one another.   
 While COP XXI falls short of meeting its 2 degrees Celsius target, it is clearly 
more substantial than any ‘agreement,’ if one can even call it that, made in Kyoto and 
Copenhagen.  Centrally important is that COP XXI established a new international 
climate change regime, explicitly obligated to revisit emission-reduction goals every five 
years through the auspices of UNFCCC.  Critical to the success of COP XXI was 
USCCP.   More work clearly needs to be done on the issue, but COP XXI established a 
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new, and thus far fairly successful, international climate change regime.  This could not 
have been accomplished without USCCP.  For that reason, USCCP was a good deal, not 
just for US and China, but for the world. 
 
A Fragile Regime 
 The new international climate regime established by the world community in 
Paris, December 2014, is a promising, comprehensive response to an issue of global 
proportions.  The international regime constructed to combat climate change is 
pragmatic, realistic, and capable.  However, for all its positive qualities, there are some 
glaring vulnerabilities within the newly established international climate change regime 
that raise the risk that the entire thing will fall in on itself.  The newly established 
international climate change regime was accomplished in large part because of USCCP.  
USCCP put to rest two major issues ailing international climate negotiations – the 
malignancy of the great polluters and the developed-developing country divide.  USCCP 
was a bandage applied, protecting the wounds of the international community suffered in 
Kyoto and Copenhagen.  If USCCP fails – if the bandage is removed – then the 
international climate regime faces the serious threat of these wounds reemerging.  
 The first great risk lays in 2016 US elections.  The newly elected president in 
2016 will reassess much of the progressive reform efforts made by President Obama both 
domestically and internationally.  It is increasingly likely the candidate representing the 
Republican Party would at least undermine efforts made by President Obama, if not fully 
repeal all executive action taken by President Obama.  The three frontrunner candidates 
at the time of writing, Donald Trump, Sen. Ted Cruz, and Sen. Marco Rubio, all threaten 
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to repeal President Obama’s climate change agenda, offer no alternative solutions, and go 
as far as denying climate change science altogether.  Sec. Hillary Clinton, the likely 
Democratic Party candidate, and her challenger Sen. Bernie Sanders, have both made 
full-throated commitments to expanding on progress made by President Obama and 
establishing a new climate change agenda of their own.99  While many remain hopeful 
that come the general election the Republican Party candidate will make an about-face on 
climate change, it seems unlikely.   
 Moreover, the US Supreme Court has halted much of the Obama Administration 
and EPA’s climate change agenda pending further review.  When the Court initially 
blocked these reforms, it seemed very likely that they would be struck down, but since 
then Justice Antonin Scalia, an archconservative on the court and a likely leader in 
arguments against the Obama Administration’s plans, passed away.  As reported by 
Eduardo Porter of New York Times, the Administration’s plans, and therefore the 
international climate change regime, rests on who the next confirmed Supreme Court 
Justice is.100  The Senate recently promised to block any nominee by the Obama 
Administration, meaning that this duty will rest with the next administration.  It is 
entirely reasonable to assume that a Democratic president would nominate a Justice 
unlikely to unravel Obama Administration plans, and that a Republican president would 
nominate a Justice likely to unravel these plans.  While it is entirely possible that a 
conservative justice could support the Administration’s plans, and it is entirely possible 
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that a liberal justice could oppose the Administration’s plans, the more likely outcome is 
that the next justice will reflect the opinions of the Administration.   
 The 2016 US elections seem then to hold the international climate regime in the 
balance.  The election of a Democrat would likely usher in an expansive period of climate 
change regulation, while the election of a Republican would likely mean that both the 
executive branch and judicial branch would be opposed to climate change action.  This is 
a clear and present danger to the international climate change regime, as Porter argues, 
because the pledges in Paris made by US are crucial to holding the international coalition 
together.100 If US were to renege on its promises, the bandage covering the wound of 
great polluter malignancy would be removed, and it is likely that the international climate 
change regime would unravel. 
 The issue of 2016 US elections is both directly and indirectly connected to China.  
It is directly connected because if US commitments to China in USCCP were rolled back 
or cheated on, China would be freed of much of the international pressure that caused 
them to agree with it in the first place.  Regardless of the outcome of US elections, 
though, China may or may not rollback reforms on its own.  If reform seems to interfere 
with economic growth in a way that threatens the legitimacy of CCP, it is entirely likely 
that reforms would be at least somewhat rolled back.  Such a move would likely be 
disincentive for other developing countries, such as Brazil and China, to participate in 
international climate negotiations.  Additionally, with China being one of the great 
polluters, curtailing reform would add to the malignancy issue. 
 Clearly, then, the sustainability of the newly established international climate 
change regime has a pending status.  2016 US elections to be held in November, along 
 126
with other factors in China, could reaffirm this regime or completely destroy it.  
However, there are other non-political factors could affect international climate change 
progress. 
 
Oil, Technology, and the Future of Climate Change 
 Firstly, the recent collapse in oil prices changes the dynamics of combating 
climate change in serious ways.  Mitchell Anderson, citing scientific studies by Carbon 
Tracker, a UK-based non-profit organization, the world must limit additional emissions 
to below 900 gigatons, with about 360 of these 900 gigatons coming from oil.101  
Basically, according to Anderson, if the worst effects of climate change are to be 
avoided, a lot of oil must stay in the ground.  Reed Landberg, a reporter for Bloomberg 
Business, points out that a recent International Energy Agency study concludes low oil 
prices will be detrimental to the development of renewable energy and fuel-efficient 
products.  According to Landberg, the IEA report projects that if oil remains near or 
below $50 per barrel until 2020, about $800 billion worth of efficiency improvements in 
cars, trucks, and airplanes would be lost.  Moreover, as Landberg argues, low oil prices 
lower the demand for renewable energy sources.102  So, low oil prices increase the 
burning of oil (thereby decreasing the quantity of oil that stays in the ground) in the short-
term, while also reducing incentive for efficiency investment. 
 Oil is not the only wild card, though.  Geo-engineering technology will have a 
profound impact on emissions for years to come.  Billionaire tech developer and 
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philanthropist Bill Gates has become a chief lobbyist for the private sector to voluntarily 
become more involved in geo-engineering research and development.  Gates told The 
Atlantic magazine that ‘we need an energy miracle,’ and he himself has pledged $2 
billion for private research and development, while getting other billionaires such as 
Virgin founder Richard Branson to join the cause.  What Gates and his peers hope to 
accomplish is to create emissions-reduction and efficient energy technology able to 
compensate for the inefficacy of governments to deliver promises made in Paris (Gates 
was an active participant in a private-sector consortium that convened in Paris parallel to 
the COP XXI Conference).103   
 Others, such as the Nobel Laureate economist Paul Krugman, argue that a slow-
moving technological revolution has already made successfully combating climate 
change an entirely plausible goal.  Krugman recently opined in the New York Times that 
dramatic reductions in the cost of electricity generated by wind and solar production 
sources, and reductions in the cost of energy storage, have made the renewables industry 
economically competitive with conventional energy industries.  Krugman argues that the 
more important factor is the outcome of the presidential election, and that having a 
President who will have an adequate climate change agenda is more crucial than 
‘moonshot’ geo-engineering developments.104 
 Clearly, non-political factors, such as the price of oil and the pace of geo-
engineering research and development will have a profound impact on the fight against 
climate change.  While the outcome of political events, especially the 2016 US 
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presidential election may have a larger impact, these non-political factors are obviously 
important. 
 
Conclusion 
 Without USCCP, COP XXI in Paris was likely to go awry.  Much of the success 
in completing negotiations is owed to the hard groundwork laid beforehand.  While the 
agreement made in Paris is probably not enough, there is reason for hope.  This 
agreement is not a one-off – the parties to the conference will regularly reconvene, and 
based on their serious approach the first time around, assumedly they will be equally 
serious going forward.  Additionally, given the pace of technological development, the 
negotiators should be able to offer more substantial emission cuts targets in the future.  
These are all good reasons to believe that this new climate change regime will be able to 
address the issue.   
 There are some reasons for caution, obviously.  Any regime comprised of nearly 
200 countries will be complicated.  Disparate interests will always water down the 
cohesion of such a wide range of countries.  The ever-changing political landscape, both 
domestic and international, threatens to throw off cooperation.  But these negative 
possibilities have yet come to pass. 
 The big question is where the international community goes from here.  It should 
take advantage of the forum it has established every five years to update their plans based 
on the changing technological landscape.  Doing so would help the international climate 
change regime meet their target of capping global temperature increase at 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 
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Conclusion 
 The most plausible explanation for rising temperatures is that man-made CO2 
emissions have caused or intensified a greenhouse gas effect.  The greenhouse gases have 
trapped radiation from the sun in Earth’s atmosphere, causing a slew of environmental 
effects, chief among them climate change.  A scientific consensus has emerged around 
this hypothesis.  Human CO2 emissions are probably a result of industrialization, and the 
immense burning of fossil fuels by economies since the Industrial Revolution.  Other 
factors may also be causing a rise in CO2 levels in Earth’s atmosphere, but any non-
human factors would only intensify the need for action, and would not repudiate the link 
between human emissions and climate change.  Developed countries are responsible for 
the lion’s share of CO2 emissions over the course of history, but every country plays a 
role in the problem, and a global consensus is necessary if the worst effects of climate 
change are to be mitigated. 
 China, the largest emitter on the globe today, finds itself in an awkward position.  
The Chinese economy relies on energy consumption to power its economic growth.  This 
has broad implications for the Chinese – the CCP relies on economic growth for 
legitimacy, millions of people remain in impoverished conditions in China, and China is 
one of the main manufacturing-export markets in the world.  However, a dangerous air 
pollution issue is increasingly being linked to the deaths of hundreds of thousands or 
more Chinese every year.  Moreover, China’s chief source of energy, coal, has been a 
problematic issue and an inefficient source of energy for the Chinese for a long time now.  
Despite efforts by the central government to reform the energy sector near the turn of the 
21st century, entrenched interest groups prevented change in the past.  Whether or not 
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China is able to grapple with its emissions going forward will have major implications for 
the global fight against climate change. 
 The United States is also major culprit of climate change.  US is the second 
largest emitter on the globe today, and has been a major emitter since the industrial 
revolution took off in the 1800s.  However, US is in the unique position today of global 
leadership, and is the country most capable of galvanizing the international community to 
address the issue.  Conversely, inaction by US political leaders could, and indeed has, 
derailed past multilateral efforts.  There is a political legacy of environmentalism 
throughout the history of US.  The ideological and practical necessity of energy security 
and sustainability is a powerful strand of the American psyche.  But climate change is not 
just a local issue; it is also a global issue.  It is therefore a much greater challenge for US 
political leaders to address than past environmental issues.  Whether President Obama 
would be able to accomplish energy reform domestically would not be enough – as the 
leader of the global community and an inheritor of an ideological and practical 
environmental impetus, President Obama’s environmental legacy is staked on whether or 
not he would be able to galvanize the international community to act. 
 His first efforts failed miserably.  Not unlike the failed Kyoto Accord negotiated 
(but not ratified) during the Clinton Administration, numerous issues plagued President 
Obama’s international agenda from the start.  He attempted to create a new international 
climate change regime in Copenhagen in 2009, but failed because of two major issues – 
the malignancy of the great polluters, namely China and US; and the wedge between 
developed and developing countries, in part caused by the failure of Kyoto.  After the 
failure of Copenhagen, President Obama sought a change of strategy.  He hoped to 
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establish a bilateral agreement with the Chinese before COP XXI in Paris.  This would 
solve both of the issues that plagued Copenhagen – it would signal that both great 
polluters were serious about addressing the issue, and would be the first attempt to bridge 
the developed-developing country divide.  The Chinese, for their part, were hesitant to 
make any agreement.  However, the air pollution issue in many Chinese cities was 
becoming so severe that the CPP could no longer avoid it.  So, to ease international 
pressure, the Chinese decided to negotiate with US.  The outcome was a voluntary pact 
struck by both countries a year before COP XXI.  The Chinese promised to cap emissions 
growth by 2030, and US promised to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 20% by 2025.  
The most important goal of the agreement was not the explicit goal of emissions 
reductions, though.  Indeed, these reductions alone would not come close to solving the 
issue.  The implicit aim of creating new momentum for COP XXI was the real reason 
behind the agreement, especially on US side.   
 The buck did not stop there, though.  Shortly after US and China struck their deal, 
Brazil decided to join in.  Moreover, China extended their promise by announcing the 
implementation of a cap-and-trade system.  It seemed like momentum was truly building 
for COP XXI.  However, once the conference began, a few thorny issues about financing 
and whether or not any new international agreement would be binding emerged.  These 
issues were not fully resolved, but compromises were struck, and a comprehensive, truly 
global COP agreement was announced, and with it, a new international regime to combat 
climate change.  Undoubtedly, the US-China Climate Pact of November 2014 played an 
integral role in this. 
   
 132
 There are many causes for pessimism, though.  The new regime looks frail.  The 
2016 election in US could lead to the end of this regime.  A slowdown in Chinese 
economic growth would make the CCP reevaluate their cap-and-trade system.   New 
issues, or reemerging issues, could derail international negotiations. 
 These possibilities are yet to come to fruition, though.  President Obama, 
President Xi, and the international community has for the first time successfully come 
together and started to seriously address climate change on a multilateral front.  One 
should remain cautiously optimistic about the prospects of the global climate change 
regime.  One should also remember the hard work that had to be done, and the hurdles 
that had to be overcome, in establishing this regime, and to appreciate just how great of a 
threat climate change is.  Doing so will make world leaders all the more hesitant to do 
anything that would unravel it. 
 While the progress that has been made is significant, there is still much work to be 
done.  The pledges made at COP XXI for the first time put a cap on rising global 
temperatures, but this cap is not low enough to prevent many negative effects of climate 
change.  The new international climate change regime has work to do in making their 
pledged targets more aggressive.  A provision is built into the agreement from COP XXI 
that establishes a regular reconvening of all the involved parties every five years.  This 
should serve as an opportunity for the countries of the world to consistently improve 
upon their pledges.  By most analyses, the agreements made in COP XXI will hold 
temperatures around 3 degrees Celsius rise since pre-industrial levels.  This does not even 
meet the stated goal of the conference to keep temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius.   
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 The scheduled regularity with which the parties of UNFCCC will reconvene 
provides a forum for every country to improve upon their pledges.  If the international 
climate change regime is to accomplish their goal of holding temperatures below a 2 
degrees Celsius target, on aggregate the parties to the conference will need to act quickly.  
Simply pledging emissions reductions via energy consumption reductions is unrealistic, 
though.  Technological developments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and geo-
engineering will help countries reduce emissions without reducing energy consumption.  
This will allow countries to maintain stable levels of economic growth while establishing 
sustainable energy sectors. 
 
Improving Renewables and Efficiency Technology 
 The major issue with renewable energy today is that these fledgling industries are 
not yet competitive with fossil fuel industries – yet.  Jeffrey Ball, a fellow at Stanford 
Law School, writing for Foreign Affairs criticizes governments, especially US, for 
leading an incomprehensible renewable energy strategy, appearing wishy-washy to 
renewable industry leaders, private investors, and taxpayers alike.  Despite this, Ball 
argues, now is a better time than ever for governments to get their acts together as 
renewable energy industries have slowly established an entrenched infrastructure.105  Ball 
describes a twofold strategy to take wind and solar power mainstream.  First, large-scale 
storage equipment, such as massive batteries, need to be developed – a responsibility that 
falls mostly on the private sector.  Secondly, governments need to overhaul their energy 
grids, creating ‘smart’ electrical-transmission grids that could tie together far-flung 
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renewable power projects. These are not far-off projects, claims John A. Turner, a 
research fellow at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.  Writing in 1999, Turner 
described methods for storing and transporting energy from renewable sources already 
exist or are in the pipeline – all that needs to be done is installation.106  Ball argues the 
goal for government should be to help make renewable energy firms profitable – then, 
Ball believes, private money will follow.  Ball thinks that governments should provide 
tax incentives and subsidies for renewables firms and consumers hoping to utilize 
renewable energy.  Importantly, governments should remain committed to their 
renewable energy strategies despite setbacks (for example, the bungled case of Solyndra 
in US).  To investors, the appearance of commitment will reassure capital markets. 
 Ball is hesitant to paint a picture of a one hundred percent renewable energy 
powered economy anytime soon.  In fact, Ball argues that ‘clean’ fossil fuels are critical 
to buttressing renewable energy production.  When power from renewables is not 
available, energy from fossil fuels should ‘switch on’ to ensure energy is widely 
available.  Making sure these sources of energy are produced, burned, and transported 
cleanly is important to the overall climate change picture.  Additionally, reducing waste 
and improving energy efficiency is essential.  Ball highlights the importance of 
improving energy efficiency in buildings, appliances, and industrial processes more 
efficient, a difficult process, but one that will reduce overhead costs for firms 
nonetheless.105  This is already happening with and without government initiative.  Firms 
are investing energy efficiency in buildings and appliances to reduce costs.  Moreover, 
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hybrid and electrical cars seem to be the wave of the future.  These trends will intensify if 
oil and gas prices rise anytime in the future. 
 
Burning without Emitting 
 Reducing emissions without reducing energy consumption is an entirely plausible 
strategy.  The effectiveness of carbon capture and sequestration (or storage) facilities is 
well known.  H. Jesse Smith, Julia Fahrenkamp-Uppenbrink, and Robert Coontz, writing 
for Science, claim that all that needs to be done is implementation.  Facilities exist that 
capture flue gas of power plants and can transport these fumes to a storage facility.  From 
these facilities, carbon dioxide is pumped under onshore geologic formations.  
Additionally, the authors express the possibility that carbon dioxide already in Earth’s 
atmosphere can be removed.107 
Richard Sayre, a biologist and biofuel researcher, claims that microalgae are 
widely recognized as being amongst the most productive biological systems for capturing 
carbon dioxide.  Sayre argues that algae is so efficient at capturing because of its ability 
to transport carbon dioxide into cells, allowing these cells to be captured and stored (if 
the carbon dioxide is not used for photosynthesis).  Sayre also emphasizes that 
developing sufficient facilities across the globe is a manageable and realistic process that 
every government can incorporate as a part of a strategy to reduce emissions.  Algae 
ponds could be used to dramatically reduce emissions.108   
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Facilities for carbon dioxide sequestration should be implemented, as well as bio-
engineered facilities to capture carbon dioxide (both before and after it enters the 
atmosphere) will help governments reduce emissions without reducing energy 
consumption.   
Renewable energy, energy efficiency, and geo-engineering are all components of 
a larger concept.  There are many ways to reduce emissions without interfering with 
economic growth.  In fact, if they are more efficient economically, they will contribute to 
economic growth and create sustainable jobs in the process.  
 
Finish the Job 
 Going forward, the parties to COP XXI will continue to have to grapple with a 
difficult task.  Climate change is perceived as a big enough threat to necessitate 
aggressive action, but allocating emissions reductions through a country’s economy is a 
difficult task.  Renewable energy technology, energy efficiency technology, and carbon 
capture and sequestration technology could make this task much easier for governments, 
and it would be wise for governments worldwide to harness and develop these elements.   
 If and when governments begin to implement and benefit from these new 
developments, their task will become much easier.  The international climate change 
regime will need to make their emissions reduction targets more aggressive at each of the 
conferences over the next decades if they are to hold temperature rises under 2 degrees 
Celsius.  Given the pace of technological development, the seriousness with which the 
international community is addressing the problem, and the establishment of an 
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international climate change regime, one should remain optimistic about the prospects for 
Earth’s climate. 
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